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The author examines the Department of Defense program
to procure and retain physicians for the armed forces. The
necessity for such a program is shown to be related to the
medical profession's policy of restricting entry into the
profession; the resulting shortage of physicians is found to
be inseparable from the national issues of health care pro-
ductivity and delivery, and the present inadequacies of
health care financing. A statement of the central issue is
formulated, tne main barriers to be overcome are identified,
and a politically moderate solution is proposed through
adoption of certain key policies. Such a solution is de-
scribed as unlikely since it requires the support and parti-
cipation of the medical profession. The alternative is a
later and more severe public and political reaction, leading
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Among its current dilemmas, the Department of Defense is
attempting to solve the problem of procurement and retention
of military medical officers in an all-volunteer force
environment. A review of these efforts leads inevitably tc
the more basic issue of the national supply of physicians,
and this issue, in turn, is inextricably related to the cen-
tral issue of health care and medical services throughout
America.
Part III of this thesis demonstrates the inseparable
complexity of the major issues and defines them as appropri-
ate subjects of public policy which are now formulated by
politically oriented professional associations and related
industry lobby groups. The resulting economic aspects of
the present system are biased heavily in favor of the medi-
cal professions and related industries, to the detriment of
adequate health care for the public. The present system of
health care financing seems an exercise in total futility.
Part IV describes systems which have been implemented
elsewhere in response to similar health care problems, and
notes alternatives and trends currently being considered in
America. In Part V, a statement of the central issue is
formulated and the barriers to be overcome are identified.
The thesis is advanced that a politically moderate solution
can be achieved through adoption of certain key policies:

- expansion of the number of physicians;
- elimination of prohibitions on innovative forms of
medical practice;
- enactment of a national health service benefits plan.
The outlook is dim for a moderate 'decentralized' solution
for that requires the support and participation of the medi
cal profession. The alternative appears to be an increas-
ingly centralized and bureaucratic system in which the
degree of socialization will likely reflect the bitterness
and costliness of the struggle for change.

II. THE PHYSICIAN NEEDS OF THE ARMED FORCES
A. THE PROBLEM SETTING
Phase-out of the general draft rooted in the Selective
Service Act of 1948, and the Nixon Administration's goal of
the all-volunteer armed forces, has surfaced and highlighted
a most critical problem in recruitment and retention of
medical service professionals in such an environment. The
doctor draft law, [1] which applies to all health professions,
has been in use on an uninterrupted basis since 1950. Al-
though the original law was permitted to expire in 1957,
military medical manpower needs were met thereafter under
the authority of the general draft, amended to provide for
"selection and induction of persons qualified in needed
medical, dental or allied specialist categories pursuant to
requisitions submitted by the Secretary of Defense." The
effect of the amended draft law was that any individual who
obtained a student deferment prior to age 26 became liable
for military service until age 35. The law was last extended
in June 1971 for an additional two-year duration.
Despite an anticipated reduction in requirements based
on an overall cutback in the standing armed forces, the ad-
ministration's plan to end the draft and move to an all-
volunteer force, makes it necessary that the Department of
Defense (DOD) take whatever steps deemed necessary to
improve the attractiveness of military medical careers.

The abolition of student deferments, combined with the
lottery system which gives young men a one-time-only draft
(if required) vulnerability at age 19, means that only about
a seven-year's supply of persons already on student defer-
ments would be liable to the doctor draft by the time they
complete their medical education.
None of this however, precludes continuation of a
doctors draft (by the congress) as necessary to meet contin-
uing needs until such requirements are fully satisfied by
voluntarism. With continuation of a regulated medical
school output, procurement of professional medical talent
can be expected to remain as a recruitment problem. This
shortage (relative to other groups) , combined with the pub-
lic's dislike of singling out specific groups for coercion,
has been put forward as an argument against both voluntarism
and the equal exposure lottery. Some argue equally well that
doctors have been among the least burdened groups by educa-
tional level. Those in the military receive special pay,
practice their specialty and suffer fewer of the risks and
discipline burdens associated with military life. [2]
Statistics through 1964 indicate that by educational level,
the medical school graduate has been 'burdened' -- that is,
has a higher military participation rate -- only in relation
to nonmedical graduate students. [3] The nonmedical graduate
student has, in general, pyramided student deferment to
graduate school, thence dependency or occupational deferment,
until no longer subject to induction. However, the medical

graduates' military participation rate is declining more
slowly than that for other groups, and can be expected to do
so until medical school output expands proportionately. The
congress may view a high military participation rate as a
price the profession pays for restricting supply into the
profession. [4]
In the absence of selective conscription or draft
induced military service, the human behavior problems
associated with recruiting and retaining military medical
professionals fall generally into two broad categories famil
iar to most everyone: income reward (incentive), and pro-
fessional (occupational) reward (satisfaction)
.
Military doctors already are paid appreciably more than
most other officers near the same age and of the same rank.
But surveys have continuously shown that doctors have a
higher per capita income than any other professional group
in the United States. [5] Career military doctors continue
to earn less than their civilian contemporaries and thus,
despite earning more than their military line officer con-
temporaries, are making financial sacrifice by remaining on
active duty beyond their obligated service. Doctors inher-
ently feel that more lucrative incomes should be a natural
follow-on to longer years of expensive academic preparation
and austere initial professional qualification. The Gates
Commission on an All-Volunteer Force [6] recommended a "new
medical pay plan" which would increase a medical officer's
total salary to $22,000 by his sixth year of service, with

annual or bi-annual increases thereafter to $39,955 for a
Colonel CO-6) with 22 years service. The sixth year figure
and a subsequent proposal [7] suggest inclusion, in this
service computation, of the five years constructive time
granted a new medical officer, by substantially increasing
his salary after one year of active duty internship.
Professional job satisfaction is a broad area worthy of
separate treatment; only highlights will be noted here.
Military doctors feel, in varying degrees, that they lack
certain opportunities more available to their civilian con-
temporaries. Among these are the availability of, or oppor-
tunity for; postgraduate/postdoctoral academic endeavors;
technological and research endeavors; and medical school
hospital faculty and administrative staff assignments. Many
career military doctors desire to pursue and remain in
clinical practice and medical specialties while advancing
independently in seniority. This is contrary to career
expectations in the military, for as medical career patterns
are now structured, senior medical officers will channel
into administrative and management jobs.

B. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
In February 1971 the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health and Environment, OASD (H§E) , revealed
a ten-point program of proposals designed to allow for future
elimination of the doctor draft law provision, to improve the
attractiveness of military careers for health care personnel,
and, not incidentally, to provide better health care services
for active-duty and retired personnel and their dependents.
The following is a brief description of each of the proposals
in the program. [8]
(1) A new competitive compensation plan for all military
medical health professionals . ... to increment military pay
sufficiently to make such pay competitive with pay scales
in the civilian economy. This point essentially proposes
implementation of the Gates Commission recommendation (or
a reasonable modification thereof) , and would extend the
"competitive salary schedule" to all other military health
care professionals -- for whom the commission recommended
"similar but somewhat less severe" pay increases.
(2) Establishment of a Uniformed Services University of
the Health Sciences . This proposal has been advocated by
the House Armed Services Committee Chairman, F. Edward
Hebert, who first suggested a "Federal Medical School,
similar in pattern of operation to the Military Academies"
in 1949. [9] He formalized and reintroduced the idea into
the 92nd congress in the form of H.R. 2, a bill "to es-
tablish a Uniformed Services University of the Health
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Sciences" in Washington, D.C., and a provision for DOD to
study the feasibility of establishing up to four similar
or like institutions in other locations of major military
hospitals. This add-on provision was thought to be in
anticipation of likely negotiation with the senate in con-
ference. As some OASD (H$E) officials put it, enactment
of the University bill will allow the Armed Services to
become producers of doctors, rather than consumers only.
(3) An increased number of flag and general officer
billets for military medical professionals -- not to the
expense of other billets, but over and above the current
legal (and so-called 'Stennis ruling') limitations on
total flag and general officer ceilings. OASD (H$E) of-
ficials reason that some star-rank billets should be
created for highly skilled physicians (such as particu-
larly qualified researchers and surgeons) who prefer to
remain in technical or clinical practice rather than shift
to medical command and management billets.
(4) An increase in the medical scholarship program . In
1971 the DOD was authorized a total of 458 scholarships
and proposed an initial increase to 1800 - 75% to be
allocated for physicians, and 251 for dentists. The pro-
gram would provide later increases in steps to 5000
scholarships -- 4,000 for physicians and dentists and 1,000
for other health fields.
(5) An independent military research and development
budget -- in the form of separate line budget items for
11

clinical investigation. All present military medical
research money comes under the overall jurisdiction of the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering. H$E offi-
cials believe the Defense Department should train its own
medical investigators, and to do this, should fund a program
big enough and challenging enough to permit retention of
more medical investigators and researchers.
(6) Personalized career planning -- This is a goal which
military health care professionals share with all other
military specialist groups, and with all service personnel.
The lack of opportunity to participate in a member's own
career development, and the 'indifference of career manage-
ment personnel' toward long range development of an
individual officer's career, have been cited in the past as
important factors contributing to the inability of the
Medical Corps to retain officers on active duty.
(7) An improved promotion system for Medical Corps
officers -- This has been accomplished in part. Medical
Corps promotion quotas no longer come under overall Line
quotas, as previously, but are established as a separate
entity (except for flag and general officer ranks) . In
addition, the vast majority of Medical Corps promotions
are now judged under 'fully qualified' rather than 'best
qualified' standards.
(8) A reduction in payback time for special training --
This, too, already has been accomplished. Until recently,
a doctor serving residency training as a military internist
12

or thoracic surgeon, for example, had to serve on active
duty for several years beyond the two years' obligation
required for other MDs . This requirement resulted in a
shortage of applicants for many much needed resident train-
ing billets. The system was changed to provide a standard
two-year payback, and there since has been a surplus of
applicants in numerous specialties.
(9) A liberalized continuation pay program -- The origi-
nal continuation pay program, established in 1968, per-
mitted a physician with over eight years active service
to receive a three-month bonus for each year of active
duty for which he agreed to extend, and gave a four-month
bonus to each physician with over twenty years of service
for each year he agreed to extend. In 1970 the program
was liberalized to permit a qualified specialist who has
completed his initial active-duty tour to get a four-
month bonus after five years of service as a medical
officer, and to give credit for civilian specialty train-
ing in computing a doctor's active service as a medical
officer.
(10) Establishment of a medical command system -- The
command relationships between the various military Medical
Corps and Service Line components can only be described as
disorganized, according to OASD (H$E) . H§E officials
believe it would make more sense to establish a medical
command system which would have jurisdiction over all of a
service's medical units and facilities in a given area.
13

The last six program points can be implemented [notwith-
standing opposition on certain specific points) administra-
tively, in whole or in part, by the Department of Defense
and appropriate components, without further legislative
action. Personalized career planning, an improved promotion
system, reduction in payback time for special training and
liberalization of continuation pay have already been
affected with satisfying results. It is as yet too early to
make a final determination as to the effectiveness of the
continuation program, but initial indications are that it is
becoming more beneficial in retaining critical skill spe-
cialists on active duty.
Establishment of an independent medical research and
development budget and a separate medical command system are
proposals typifying an on-going rivalry among military line
and specialists groups. These items are likely to continue
to receive significant opposition from all interested ele-
ments other than medical.
The other program points, (1) through (4), require
additional authorization and/or appropriation legislative
action. Increased compensation continues to receive con-
siderable mention as 'necessary 1 to 'essential' in various
plans and amounts of increase from $10,000 to $16,300
annually. [10] This item is no doubt receiving quiet but
firm opposition from other elements; other component officer
specialists such as lawyers already feel discriminated
against, as well as line officers who are concerned over the
14

widening gap between their pay and medical pay. Advocacy
for increased compensation comes primarily from OASD (H§E)
officials and component Surgeon Generals, while other ele-
ments
,
including congress, appear willing to await a more
definitive determination of continuation pay effectiveness.
Major provisions of congressman Hebert's bill for
increasing medical scholarships and establishing an armed
forces medical school received substantial opposition in the
Senate. [11] A conference version of the bill was passed by
both houses in September, '72. The bill provides for up to
5000 scholarships at civilian medical schools, providing
student's tuition plus $400 monthly, and that each student
will serve a year on active duty as a medical officer for
each year of scholarship aid. Some medical school programs
now run as long as six years. The bill also authorizes a
Uniformed University of the Health Sciences in the Washington
D.C. area. It is to produce no fewer than 100 physicians a
year within 10 years, and will use existing facilities at
Walter Reed, Bethesda, and Andrews AFB hospitals. Students
at the University will receive the full pay and allowances
of the first officer pay-grade (0-1) and serve seven years on
active duty after graduation. The cost of the first 10 years
has been estimated at $102 million but the senate committee
members have expressed feelings that the cost is understated.
A provision to lift the limitation on promotions of
medical officers to general and flag rank was deleted from
15

the compromise version of the bill. This program proposal
will likely continue to receive substantial opposition.
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III. THE ISSUES IN NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY
A. THE NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS
1 . Background
The problem defined in Part II is but a manifesta-
tion --a symptom -- of a more serious problem within the
socio-economic, political and academic segments of our
national public policy. The proposed solution, likewise, is
but a treatment of this symptom -- a short range plan for
temporary relief -- within the capabilities of one department
of government operations.
It does not appear that professional medical per-
sonnel supply problems can be reasonably solved within a
voluntary demand-and-supply framework for a number of years,
and without significant changes in our public, institutional
and government attitudes on a national scale. Why the supply
of doctors has not adjusted to demand needs has been readily
explained by past observers. Friedman and Kuznets noted in
1954 that entrance into the profession was being blocked. [12]
In 1967 Dr. Rashi Fein observed that "Medicine is one of the
few fields in which supply is restricted at the point of
entry into the educational system rather than into the
profession." [13]
The problem is an outgrowth of constructive begin-
nings; the creation of a permanent Countil on Medical Educa-
tion by the American Medical Association in 1904, and the
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publication in 1910 of Abraham Flexner's comprehensive study
of the standards and quality of professional training in
American medical schools. In Flexner's opinion, of the 131
medical schools in the United States in 1910, fewer than 40
supplied "the distinctly better quality of medical training."
[14]
American medical school enrollments declined from a
high point of approximately 28 thousand in 1904 to less than
14 thousand in 1920. The training legally required of medi-
cal practitioners has been systematically extended since the
beginning of the century from three or four years of pro-
fessional education preceded by two years of high school, to
six or seven years preceded by graduation from high school.
The legal requirements for premedical education generally
match the requirements that medical schools must impose in
order to be approved by the Council on Medical Education.
The actual level of premedical education is maintained higher
than that required by medical schools, or by law, by the
'selection' method of accepting applicants -- a method which
might be considered a 'creaming policy'.
The number of applicants accepted by medical schools
began increasing again in the 1920s. The percentage of
applicants accepted fluctuated from 64.2 percent in 1926 to
51.5 percent in 1929 and climbed again to 62.2 percent in
1933. [15] In that year came one of the first explicit
warnings on restricting entry into the profession. Harold
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Rypins, then secretary of the New York State Board of Medical
Examiners, stated:
"Too many (people) are still unaware that American
medical schools are definitely committed to a policy of
restricting the number of their students. In all the
professions there has developed in the last few years, an
aristocratic, or at least a restrictive movement which,
in a sense, is reminiscent of the medieval guilds. The
trend is still in an early stage, but in law, medicine,
dentistry and other professions under control of state
licensure, the signs are apparent ... Without intention
or design, the far-reaching steps taken by the physicians
to raise educational standards during the past twenty-five
years has resulted in limiting the number of students. Now,
realizing the advantages of this unplanned restriction,
leaders . . . are taking definite steps to cut down the
professional class." [16]
A search of the literature over the next few years following
1933, shows this statement to be representative of the
opinion of medical leaders, whether in condemnation or
justification of the policy. [17]
Seemingly unimpressed by these early expressions,
the Council on Medical Education issued, in 1934 (and pub-
lished in 1935), a warning "against the admission of larger
classes than can properly be accommodated or than can
reasonably be expected to satisfy approved scholastic
standards;" they continued with the comment that "seven
19

schools have definitely stated that their enrollment will be
decreased and others have indicated adherence to the Council's
principles." [18] In each of the five years prior to 1934 for
which data are available, with the possible exception of 1929,
there was an increase in the number of applicants accepted by
approved U.S. medical schools. [19] Each of the six years
from 1934 through 1939 showed a successive decrease from the
previous year. In 1938 the percentage of applicants accepted
reached a post World War II low of 51.3 percent. More re-
cently the percentage of applicants accepted have been as
shown in Table I.
TABLE I
Selected Medical School Applicant Acceptance Percentages [20]
Total Number Percentage of New






One observer explains the rising number of appli-
cants and students both accepted and rejected thusly:
"....physicians' salaries have become embarrass-
ingly high ($40,550 median in 1969, according to Medical
Economics ) , causing even the AMA to admit that we could
use more doctors. The relative income advantage of doc-










has grown wider and wider --no doubt one reason why the
number of applicants to medical schools with advanced
degrees in other fields increased from 552 in 1970 to
1,896 in 1972. The rising percentage of rejected appli-
cants has created pressure to let a few more in. Accord-
ing to Mrs. W. F. Dube of the Association of American
Medical Colleges, 'Every week we get phone calls from
people who are successful lawyers and engineers who want
to switch to medicine.'" [21]
For additional explanation of the absolute numbers since
1968, see section IV B.
The traditional measure of the number of physicians
is the physician-population ratio: number of physicians per
100,000 population. Proponents of our past medical educa-
tion policies and defenders of the status quo often point to
the relative stability of the ratio since its inception.
Some have found the concept of the ratio more confusing than





Physicians per 100,000 Population in the United States
Year Table IIA Ratios* Table IIB Ratios**
Total In Private Practice
1900 157
1910 146
1921 134 - NOT
1931 126 - Available
1942 134
1949 135
1950 134 151 109
1955 132 152 101
1959 133
1960 - 151 98
1962 136
1963 - 152 97
1965 - 156 97
* Source: U.S. Public Health Service, Health Manpower Source
Book
,
Sec. 9, 1959, p. 9, and ibid., Sec. 14, 1962, p. 5;
cited in Fein, op. cit., p. 66. Table IIA ratios do not in-
clude Doctors of Osteopathy (D.O.) but do include non-
practicing M.D.s -- retired, teaching, etc.
** Source: Data from U.S. Public Health Service, Health
Resources Statistics: Health Manpower, 1965, no. 1509, p.
100; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports, series p-25, no. 353, 18 Nov. 1966; cited in Fein,
op. cit., p. 68. Table IIB ratios include D.O.s and non-
practicing M.D.s and D.O.s. Figures for 1965 include









E. North Central 120
South Atlantic 116
Mountain 115
W. North Central 114
W. South Central 101
E. South Central 89
* Source: U. S. Public Health Service, Health Manpower
Perspective: 1967, Washington D.C., 1967, p. 14.
TABLE IV
Nonfederal Physicians per 100,000 Population by
Selected States: 1965*
State Ratio
New York State 217
Mississippi 74
Alaska 71
District of Columbia 373
U.S. Mean 145
U.S. Median 120
* Source: U. S. Public Health Service, Health Resources




Nonfederal Physicians (M.D.s) per 100,000 Population
by Area: 1965*
Active in Private Practice
Total General Fu 11 Time
Area Active Total Practice S£ecialty
United States 125 91 35 56
Metropolitan-Adj acent 136 98 35 63
Greater Metro. 173 118 38 80
Lesser Metro. 125 92 30 62
Adjacent to Metro. 75 65 38 27
Isolated 75 65 38 27
Semirural 81 69 38 31
Rural 46 44 38 6
* Source: U. S. Public Health Service, Health Manpower
Source Book, Sec. 18, Manpower in the 1960s, p. 25. The
difference between total active and total active in private
practice is accounted for by hospital staff, interns, resi-
dents, teaching, research, industry, etc.
Present day discussions based on the physician-
population ratio have a tendency to become meaningless due
to changes in the nature or medical practice and the environ-
ment of health care services over the preceding forty years.
Physicians frequently emphasize that the rapid growth of
urban areas and of transportation and hospital facilities has
increased the number of patients a physician can care for
effectively. Others point out that on the other hand, the
advances in medical science have probably increased the
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attention that must be devoted to the treatment of each
patient, as well as the number of cases recognized as requir-
ing medical attention. It can hardly be denied that the
effect of specialization and group practice on medical ser-
vices and health care delivery is not revealed by the
simple ratio. William H. Stewart writes:
"Specialization has completely altered the meaning
of the physician-population ratio by which manpower
needs have been measured for many years . We know that
the gross ratio has remained fairly constant in recent
years. We do not really know what the ratio means. "[22]
2 . The Social and Moral Issues
The organization of medical education in the United
States permits close control over the admission practices and
standards of the individual medical schools. Friedman and
Kuznets noted in 1954 that in all but three states, either
legal requirements or the rules of the Boards of Examiners
[23] specify that among individuals studying in this country
or in Canada, only graduates of medical schools approved by
the Council on Medical Education and Hospitals of the
American Medical Association, may take the examination for
admission to practice. Thus through the approval process,
the Council on Medical Education has almost complete control
over the number of medical schools. In addition, the Council
has direct contact with and influence over each school
through its accrediting activities. [24]
25

From 1900 to 1964,vhile the population climbed 1521,
real per capita income 2 8 % , bachelor degrees 1,7301, and
graduate degrees approximately 50001, medical and dental
school output edged up only 341 and 40% respectively. In
recent years the United States has imported approximately
181 of its new licenteates, primarily to fill institutional
internship and residency vacancies. Dr. Fein estimated in
1967 that medical service demand will grow 1.8 times faster
than the population; this is slightly greater than the supply
of the medical services projected growth rate and is expected
to widen rather than narrow past shortages. [25]
The rationale most often advanced in support of con-
trolling entry into the medical profession is maintenance of
quality physicians. Interesting, as well as morally dis-
turbing, is the fact that the percentage of applicants pre-
viously refused medical school entry who are subsequently
accepted, is only slightly lower than the percentage of first
applicants accepted. [26] Certainly those reapplying after
initial rejection are fewer and likely possess better pre-
medical qualifications, and the time lapsing between the
first refusal and later acceptance may have been spent in
additional training - which is precisely what one would
expect from a creaming process. Nevertheless, it seems
reasonable that the supply of innate ability is sufficient
to furnish each year more medical students than are admitted
to medical schools. It must also be remembered that a small
but significant percentage of applicants (71 estimated)
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rejected by approved American schools, apply and enter the
few unapproved schools or foreign schools, and are later
licensed or otherwise certified to practice in the United
States.
Arguments of quality versus quantity often dissipate
into undeterminable subjective judgements of the difference
between good quality and high(est) quality. Some data in
general seem to indicate that the relationship between
quality of performance as a physician and the traditional
measure of quality of an applicant for admission to medical
school is much more tenuous than was previously assumed.
The data indicated that physicians performing at a lower
level of competency had a less comprehensive group of
clinical skills. This, however, did not seem to correlate
with the quality of the institution in which they were
educated or trained, or the undergraduate record which the
student had compiled. [27] Other reports indicate that:
- Better medical students tend to become better physi-
cians .
- One is more likely to be a better physician if he has
had more internal medicine experience.
- There seems to be little or no relationship between
academic performance and family or community background
nor was the medical college aptitude test of signifi-
cant predictive value.
- It appears on the average that the better medical
student performs at a higher level of proficiency for
27

a few years after entering practice, but that this
effect disappears around the age of thirty-five. [28]
The question of trade-off between quality and quantity
has seemingly not been approached in an unqualified manner.
The traditional answer has not embraced the need for trade-
offs and has usually taken the form "what is needed are
more physicians of the highest quality", [29] rather than,
what is needed are more qualified physicians.
The moral issue relates to the question of the right
of qualified students to pursue studies in the fields that
interest them. The essence of this is that, even if profes-
sional licensing arrangements are justified in order to
assure quality, it is quite another matter to prevent stu -
dents from pursuing medical education if they so desire and
are qualified . This practice seemingly violates the concepts
of a non-discriminatory policy in educational opportunity,
and of an individual's freedom of choice, a phrase held in
high esteem by medical professionals after licensing. It is
not clear that medicine should single itself out as a pro-
fession in which the number of students accepted is more a
function of future "needs," as defined by the profession ,




B. THE ORGANIZATION OF HEALTH CARE PRODUCTIVITY AND DELIVERY
1
.
Solo (Individual) versus Group Practice
The physician's fee-for-service solo practice has
long been the traditional form of organization for deriving
medical care services in the United States. It has become
the symbol and expression of the doctor's individual inde-
pendence and professional freedom of choice. For three to
four decades an increasing number of persons knowledgeable
in the fields of medicine and economics have felt that an
expansion of group practice would foster improvements in our
system of health care and medical services. Medical oriented
observers believe group practice would enhance the quality of
care; economists view it as saving or improving the utiliza-
tion of scarce resources; others feel that it would foster
new financing mechanisms from which would stem desirable con-
sequences for both patients and physicians, and for auxil-
iary health care personnel. The author has noted a consis-
tent theme of 'well patient' or 'health maintenance'
emphasis throughout descriptions of existing comprehensive
group practice plans, particularly prepaid plans.
There is a spectrum of differing group practices.
A group may consist of two or three specialists with adjoin-
ing offices and sharing the services and costs of ancillary
personnel and equipment. A clearer contrast of solo and
group practice may be perceived, however, if we define a
group practice as an association of physicians of different
specialties, working together at one location and sharing
29

financial arrangements among themselves, and with their
patients, according to some prearranged plan, to render as
nearly complete services to their clients as possible.
This arrangement can be referred to as a comprhensive group
practice with fee-patients (standardized fee-for-service)
or with prepaid group plan patients. It has been estimated
that nine percent of all physicians in private practice are
practicing in groups, [30] but that only six percent are in
comprehensive group practice. [31]
The advantages and disadvantages of group practice
have been discussed by numerous observers. The following
are among the advantages most often noted: [32]
(1) If sick people are to receive good care, they
must see more than one physician. Group practice provides
an efficient form of organization.
(2) Group practice keeps a physician alert since
other physicians observe and sometimes participate.
(3) Consultation with other physicians of the same
or differing specialties is easier and more efficient.
(4) Additional expensive equipment is more easily
obtained and more economically employed.
(5) The physician does not have direct financial
dealings with the patient. Medical judgements and decisions
are not influenced by financial considerations.
(6) Group practice permits the physician to concen-
trate on those things which he feels best qualified to do --
yet provides convenient access to other specialists.
30

(7) Group practice has the potential of raising the
quality of care since it permits each physician to more
readily schedule time off for postgraduate courses, special
studies, conferences and so forth.
On the other hand the following disadvantages of
group practice are often argued:
(1) The above advantages seem true in theory but
not in practice.
(2) The individual practitioner can handle most
medical needs. The extra physicians and equipment add
unnecessary costs.
(3) The group practice physician does not "grow"
since he is supervised and not "on his own". Furthermore, he
is cut off from the larger medical community.
(4) In most places it is easy to obtain consulta-
tion. The individual physician, therefore, need not be
limited to consultation only with the specialists in a group.
(5) The patient does not feel that he has his "own"
physician, nor can he choose to see a specialist outside the
group.
(6) Many inadequately trained physicians who would
not succeed in solo practice, join groups.
The advantages and disadvantages cited are numerous
though not exhaustive; some more significant, some less so.
Some may apply to one or more groups but need not apply to
group practice in general. It is noteworthy that many of
the criticisms of group practice involve physician-physician
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and patient-physician relationships rather than health care
and medical service productivity matters. Such relation-
ships are most certainly important, but the prevailing
attitudes on these matters need not be assumed unchangeable.
It seems reasonable that these attitudes can change if group
practice were to grow in size and influence so that both
patients and physicians were better acquainted with the con-
cept and practice. For instance, in actual health care
systems in other countries and comprehensive prepaid group
plans in the United States and Canada, the members are
encouraged to select one personal family physician as their
primary source of medical care and contact point for access
to the rest of the system or plan.
Other criticisms, such as the use of inadequately
trained specialists, are not basic criticisms of group prac-
tice. Even if the charge were true, it is not an inherent
characteristic of group practice that poorly trained physi-
cians must be used. Furthermore, the alternative would be
solo practice by these same poorly trained physicians. It
is quite likely that, from the public's point of view, such
physicians should practice in groups (where a measure of
control and a further learning process is possible) rather
than in solo practice.
The advantages cited in favor of group practice seem
far more compelling than do the arguments against this organi
zational form. Some of these potential benefits relate to
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economic considerations, others to the relationship of the
specialist to other physicians and to the patient. [33]
In economics it is often found that larger organi-
zational units are able to achieve economies that are denied
to those of smaller size. These "economies of scale" result
from the fact that certain divisions of labor and speciali-
zation are made possible and justified when the number of
units produced -- or services rendered -- is sufficiently-
large. Furthermore, various types of equipment and kinds of
personnel are only available in whole units. We cannot buy
half a machine or employ half a person. Thus such equipment
and personnel are used more efficiently in larger-size
production units. Therefore, as the scale of operations
increases, economies arise in part as the result of the
possibilities for a greater division of labor, more extensive
specialization and use of special equipment and personnel.
As economies of scale exist in other sectors of the economy,
so do they exist in medical care, for example, in hospitals.
We may also expect that they would be present in group prac-
tice as contrasted with solo practices.
Since medical care involves other personnel and
capital equipment as well as the physician, it is unlikely
that the optimal combination of factors is to be found in
the office of the solo practitioner. For that to be the case
these factors -- physician, nurse, equipment -- would be
utilized in whole unit relationships to each other, for
example, one physician, two nurses, one x-ray machine. This
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is not likely and even less so if the practice is more general
and the equipment (and personnel) required more varied, yet
more infrequently used. Should the optimum ratio of nurses
to physicians prove to be 1.6, for example, the solo practi-
tioner would depart farther from the optimum than three
physicians practicing in a group with five nurses, or ten
physicians employing seventeen nurses. Nor is it likely that
the appropriate ratio is one x-ray machine per general
practitioner or pediatrician.
This inflexibility in solo practice may have various
consequences. Some or all of them may exist in varying
degrees. Physicians may do without some equipment or per-
sonnel which would be useful. Thus the physician is operat-
ing at lower productivity than would otherwise be the case,
perhaps rendering less service, perhaps rendering a lower
quality of service. Alternatively, physicians may purchase
more equipment or employ more personnel than is needed.
The equipment or personnel may then stand idle for periods
of time because "it is better to have too much rather than
too little." This results in an inflation of costs of medi-
cal care since all patients will share in paying for the
inefficiency. This is not meant to imply that payment should
be made only by those who use certain parts of the capital
investment. The principle that all patients pay for the
x-ray machine even though only some need it, seems desirable,
however the point here is that it would be less inflationary
if all patients paid for one machine that operated at
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capacity, rather than for two machines, each operating at
fifty percent capacity. On the other hand, the availability
of underutilized resources (equipment and personnel) may,
unconsciously or by design, induce unnecessary use of the
resources (overdoctoring) to help pay for them. One way to
justify high prices to the consumer is to render more (even
if unnecessary) services. In the field of health care and
medical services the consumer is woefully ill-equipped to
judge whether services are necessary or helpful.
The more efficient use of personnel would also
enable a saving of physicians' time. In a group practice
situation -- with consequent division of labor -- physicians
would be freed to carry on those tasks for which, by virtue
of their training and experience, they are uniquely qualified.
If physicians are providing services that do not require the
special skills of a physician, group practice can provide an
organizational framework which makes it easier to accomplish
those services with ancillary personnel. This new division
of labor would thus bring benefits on the manpower side since,
in enabling the physician more effectively to limit his prac-
tice to matters and procedures which require his particular
qualifications, the effective supply of physicians' services
would be increased. After his studies, Russel V. Lee stated:
"Perhaps one of the greatest advantages of group
practice lies in its ability to use a large number of
paramedical personnel who spare the doctor many hours
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of time and bring the patients benefits ordinarily un-
available. .. .This has great economic advantage in free-
ing the physician for purely professional activity." [34]
The absence of a sufficient number of detailed studies
and comparisons of group and solo practice makes it difficult
to assess the full dimensions of the potential health care,
medical service and economic benefits of group practice.
While there are a number of group practices in the United
States, the data they have generated have been used chiefly
for management control purposes and have not been sufficient-
ly subjected to critical evaluation. With limited analysis
and with inadequate measure of quality, it is not clear
whether the results obtained apply to the particular group
practice examined or whether they could be generalized.
A 1960 survey of group practice in Canada, found
that the use of ancillary personnel was greater -- yet the
net income of physicians was higher -- in group practice
(due to increased productivity), than in solo practice. [35]
A detailed study has been made which compares the
experience of families insured under two comprehensive group
plans in New York City: The Health Insurance Plan of Greater
New York (HIP) and Group Health Insurance, Inc. (GHI) . HIP
is a prepaid plan and GHI pays on a fee-for-service basis.
The study found that: [36]
- GHI enrollees had a higher hospital admission rate
(11 percent) annually than HIP enrollees (6.3 percent).
They (GHI) also stayed in the hospital more days.
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- GUI subscribers had a higher utilization of surgical
procedures both in and out of hospitals.
- The physician visit rate (excluding surgical and
obstetric visits) in home, office and hospital was about
the same for goth groups.
In a study of the Federal Employees Health Benefit
Program (FEHBP) , it was found that the number of non-
maternity hospital days per 100 patients was 86 for those
covered by Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 77 for those enrolled in
indemnity plans, and only 43 for those enrolled in group
practice plans. [37]
Another study of the FEHBP for 1966, found that
98 of every 1,000 Blue Cross-Blue Shield patients were
hospitalized, compared to 46 of every 1,000 prepaid group
members. Blue Cross-Blue Shield patients spent 876 days in
the hospital, compared to 408 for the group members. There
were 73 operations per 1,000 Blue Cross-Blue Shield sub-
scribers, and 31 per 1,000 among group practice members. [38]
The trend in these figures might be attributed to:
- Overutilization in fee-for-service plans;
- Underutilization in prepaid group plans;
or one of the above combined with the contention that pre-
paid group practice is health maintenance or well-patient
oriented, and therefore requires less utilization. Follow-
ing his study, George N. Monsma, Jr. wrote:
"Finally it was concluded that the differences in
surgical rates seem to be caused at least in part, by
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overutilization in the insured fee-for-service situation
rather than by underutilization in the salaried group
practice situation." [39]
Recent and current literature contain conflicting ref-
erences to prohibitions against group practice or prepaid
group practice:
- "The influence of the medical lobby has helped
to write prohibitions or restrictions on Prepaid Group
Practice into the statute books of more than half of
our states." [40]
- "I was surprised to learn of the power of medical
societies in maintaining laws in twenty-two states which
restrict physicians from forming new types of group
practice to compete with older forms of solo practice." [41]
- "This is why the AMA has pressured seventeen states
into out-lawing such plans, and has been prosecuted under
antitrust laws for trying to kill prepaid plans in other
states." [42]
A study of state legislation in 1969 found that in
less than half the states was the situation sufficiently
defined to enable prepaid consumer-sponsored group practices
to be developed without concern about possible legal
restraints. In some states, the law requires a majority of
the board of directors of such plans to consist of physi-
cians, and in some there are requirements that all physi-
cians in an area have the privilege of joining the plan
should they so desire. Other restrictions hinge on
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organizational and fiscal requirements of the plans, including
questions of limited liability, tax and insurance. [43]
2 . The Hospital System
The literature indicates that, at least as early as
the post World War II planning period, there was remarkable
agreement with respect to the central role of the general
hospital in modern medical care.
The four basic functions of the envisioned general
hospital were summarized by the Commission on Hospital Care
in 1947; the hospital is a workshop for the physician; it is
an educational center; it is a center for medical research;
it is a center for community health, including prevention of
disease, care of ambulatory patients and home care. [44] In
August 1948, the journal, Modern Hospital , devoted a special
issue to "The Hospital of the Future", to which leading
hospital administrators, physicians, and architects contri-
buted. Their major theme, as they looked fifty years ahead,
can be summed up in the words of Dr. E. L. Crosby, later the
director of the American Hospital Association:
..
"The greatest change will be the metamorphosis of
the hospital from a diagnostic and curative headquarters
into a community health center, with all (that) this
entails. The outpatient department will be at least of
equal importance with inpatient facilities."
All agreed that group practice would be the major pattern for
outpatient as well as inpatient care.
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In 1952 the President's Commission on the Health
needs of the Nation said:
"Hospitals are at the heart of our modern medical
system. .. .More and more, (the modern hospital) is becom-
ing responsible for a continuing flow of health services
to the community, supplying preventive services in health
centers at one end of the line and rehabilitative and
home care services at the other end." [45]
To date, however, few general hospitals have been
equipped or philosophically oriented toward the fulfillment
of anything like these advanced but aging concepts. Most
are still primarily concerned with the treatment of short-
term acute illnesses. Preventive medicine, ambulatory care,
the problems of the chronically ill, research and health
education are clearly secondary in priority. Advancements
in the traditional area of inpatient care are overshadowed
by the soaring costs of elaborateness, overutilization of
beds (admissions), underutilization of duplicated sophisti-
cated equipment and services. This has proved a bitter
disappointment to many hospital administrators who hoped to
see the general hospital develop more rapidly toward the
physical and organizational synthesis of the major aspects
of medical care -- prevention, diagnosis, treatment and
rehabilitation. We are still faced with the question of
whether the hospital should be the doctor's workshop oj_
the Community's health center. Idealistically a hospital
should be both --a synthesis between these major concepts,
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and between the major groups responsible for the complex and
wide-ranging objectives of the hospital -- trustees and
administrators, and the physicians and medical staff.
There is a sharp dichotomy in hospital organization.
[46] The roots of this conflict between health care personnel
and management apparently go back to eighteenth century
Britain and the establishment of the Anglo-American tradition
of voluntary hospitals. There was no such dichotomy in
medieval days when hospitals were operated, with little
medical assistance, by monastic orders for the sick poor.
There is apparently no such duality in the major European
hospitals which are usually run by full-time chiefs-of-
medical-services , with complete authority. The distinguish-
ing feature of the Anglo-American voluntary hospital, how-
ever, has been its use by private physicians for private
patients with little or no accompanying administrative or
financial responsibility. In return, the doctor normally
donated care for the hospitalized indigent who constituted
the majority of the hospital population.
Recent developments -- the hospital's increases in
size, complexity, utilization, cost, and its greatly altered
financial base -- have intensified the inherent instability
of this administrative structure. Health insurance, public
medical care programs, and the new patterns of hospital
utilization have transformed the large majority of admissions
into paying patients. The growing public investment in
hospital construction and operation and the emergence of
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private and public health insurance plans, both tend to
enlarge the role of the hospital as a community-service
organization. The indigent patients, those who bother to
seek medical aid, are paid for at least in part by public
funds, but their treatment is being increasingly relegated
to sparse public emergency rooms and clinics.
The hospital has become an indispensable workshop
for the modern physician who finds it virtually impossible
to practice medicine without hospital affiliation. The
hospital is the center of his professional world, and he is
acknowledged to be its key figure. A considerable amount of
the private physician's income is earned in the hospital.
Quite naturally he wants the institution equipped with the
latest scientific and technological facilities. But the
doctor's relationship to the hospital is ambiguous. As a
rule he assumes neither administrative nor financial
responsibility, yet, in practice, his is the most influential
voice in the organization. He admits and discharges patients;
he alone can diagnose, prescribe, and treat patients. With
his high professional status, he may, in many hospitals,
countermand administrative orders and ignore authority. The
result is the confusing duality that prevails today throughout
the hospital system.
There may be internal problems as well. Within the
hospital the administrator finds that part of his personnel
are involved in conflicting lines of authority to him and to
the medical staff; and the trustees may find themselves at
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odds with staff doctors over whom they have only tenuous
authority.
The problem of hospital organization goes to the
heart of the problem of medical care organization in general;
the necessity for reconciling large-scale organization and
large-scale financing with the continuing need for highly
individualized services. [47]
It is sometimes proposed that hiring the entire
medical staff and director on a salary or contract basis
would increase the physicians' sense of responsibility for
hospital administration and operation, and help clarify lines
of accountability. This is a distasteful prospect to many
doctors but, as yet, they have failed to accompany their
objections with any positive or constructive alternatives of
their own. It seems clear that most have no interest in
participating in the financial and operational responsibility
for the hospitals.
The complete staff -director concept has been demon-
strated at a few hospitals, such as the Henry Ford in Detroit
and the Cleveland Clinic Hospital , with significant success in
integrating the professional and administrative structures,
and without compromising or restricting professional integ-
rity. Most of the profession, however, seems vigorously
opposed to such practice, alleging "hospital domination" or
"lay control" or invoking the "corporate practice of
medicine" argument. When viewed within the concept of
full-time medical directors and chief -of -services , however,
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the controversy seems not so much that of lay control as that
of persuading the physician to modify his independent
entrepreneurial role in favor of responsible administration,
management and institutional teamwork.
The duality conflict in hospital organizational
relationship leads to other costly and detrimental influences,
The American Hospital Association Guide Issue includes a
multiple set of separate standards of approval to which
hospitals are subject -- including, but not limited to:
accreditation by the Joint Commission on Hospital Accredita-
tion; medical school affiliation; residency and internship
programs approved by the AMA; approved nursing schools or
programs; AMA specialty boards approval; cancer program
approval by the American College of Surgeons; etc. In such
a climate, it is hardly surprising that the hospital system
has become a virtual arena for numerous organizational
conflicts
.
The most quoted (and likely valid) answer to why
hospitals costs are out-pacing every other form of inflation,
is the belated catch-up in sub-standard wages for hospital
employees. Labor represents more than half of a hospital's
costs and their employees were long among the country's
most underpaid groups. By unionization and collective
bargaining, and aided by minimum wage requirements, they have
improved their income standards considerably.
The other most significant reason for the ballooning
cost of hospital care is the exceptionally expensive array of
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new medical facilities and hardware and the highly trained
personnel necessary for operation. During the 1950s, hos-
pitals were independently busy acquiring clinical labora-
tories, electrocardiographs, blood banks, radioactive
isotope therapy facilities, and ever increasing capabilities
to perform lengthening batteries of laboratory and x-ray
tests. More recently the drive has been for kidney dialysis
units, tumor institutes, open-heart surgery units and teams,
and additional radiation therapy facilities -- all tremen-
dously expensive hardware requiring highly paid personnel --
with much duplication and underutilization -- and all paid for
by spreading the costs among each and every patient.
An open-heart surgery unit generally requires a
skilled team of twelve doctors, nurses and technicians main-
tained on constant stand-by. It is estimated that over 800
American hospitals maintain these units as a high prestiege
item. To function efficiently, a team should be regularly
doing one operation a week. It has been estimated that in
possibly a third of these hospitals, as much as a year may
pass without a single operation being performed. [48]
A major contributing factor to the inflation of
hospital costs has been the greater willingness of health
insurance to pay for hospital bills rather than for physi-
cian's fees and outpatient services, combined with an excess
of hospital beds. And when the health insurance business
finally extended coverage to include some outpatient care,
and the government tightened up on Medicare and Medicaid
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abuses, this produced a worsening situation. Hospitals were
left with 20 to 25 percent of their beds empty in a period
when hospital construction was accelerating, thereby adding
to the demand for and bidding up the price of physicians'
services. The excess supply of hospital beds does not -- as
we normally think of it in other industries -- drive prices
down, but up, because a high fixed overhead is divided among
fewer patients.
This situation has prompted some few individual states
to pass laws which permit them to:
- Forbid both the construction of new hospitals and
the expansion of those already built.
- Force disclosure, for the first time, of contracts
under which some doctors (e.g., pathologists, radiol-
ogists, anesthesiologists) have customarily received
hundreds of thousands of dollars a year for speci-
alized services performed in hospitals.
- Approve hospital rates before they go into effect
and reject rates deemed to be excessive.
- Compel a group of hospitals in one area to pool
facilities to avoid duplication of, for example,
expensive cancer treatment equipment.
- Install on state boards and councils dealing with
health care a majority of consumer representatives,
(an idea that would have been considered revolu-




From a national perspective such actions by the
states produce fragmented results, but at least there is a
widening recognition of the problem. Since 1964, New York
has blocked construction of some 48,000 unnecessary beds in
general hospitals and 37,000 beds in long-term care facili-
ties. Converted to dollars, it is estimated that $1.3 billion
in capital expenditures has been saved, plus $600 million
yearly in operating costs. [49]
In a 1972 report, the General Accounting Office
analyzed the need for hospital beds in Baltimore, Cincinnati,
Denver, Jacksonville, Florida, San Francisco and Seattle.
The report concluded that the cities collectively would have
4,228 more beds than would be needed by 1975. This number
may seem modest, but the Atlanta Regional Commission, which
coordinates a seven-county area around the city, estimates
that it is overbedded by 2,000 units at a cost to the area
of more than $28 million a year.
Eighty percent of new hospital starts now are profit
making hospitals (although ten years ago it was the other
way around) . Physicians are owning stock in the corporations
that build and operate these new private hospitals and they
tend to refer patients to these hospitals. But it's good
business sense not to send the indigent patients, so they
(more frequently) refer those with money. People who are
less affluent are referred to the nonprofit hospitals. The
result is that the private, profit making hospitals, skim
off the cream of the paying patients, leaving the non-profit
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hospitals with fewer and less affluent patients to assume an
increasing share of the fixed high overhead costs. [50] This
trend has spurred twenty-two states to clamp down on hospital
construction with certif ication-of -need laws.
The voluminous and labyrinthine statistics of health
care costs can be sorted and selected to support almost any
thesis desired. A central theme throughout, however, seems
to bear out the theory that hospitals charge as much as the
traffic will bear, and that the number of physicians is
sufficiently small that they can locate where the money is.
[51] Dr. Charles Lewis, of Harvard's Center for Community
Health, conducted a study which indicated that the need for
medical treatment mysteriously seems to rise to meet the
available capacity. Dr. Lewis states it this way:
•'Parkinson' s Law applies in the medical care system
as it now exists. The number of beds available in a
community determines the extent of hospitalization.
The number of surgeons available determines the frequency
of operations performed. The amount of money available
for insurance coverage determines the amount of money
spent for medical care." [52]
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C. HEALTH CARE FINANCING
1 . Private (Voluntary) Health Insurance
Political debate over health care has historically
centered on methods of paying the increasing costs of
modern medicine. The AMA's mid-century (1949-52) national
campaign lobbied successfully against plans for a federal
health insurance system for all age groups. The campaign
cost $4,678,000 and resulted in what has been expressed as
'a landmark in the annuls of public relations' (but not in
health care development). [53] Thereafter, only moderate
effort was required to sustain the campaign and stop consid-
eration of national health insurance, stigmatized as
socialistic and for its anticipated "crushing cost, wasteful
inefficiency, bureaucratic dead weight, and debased stand-
ards of medical care." [54]
The demand for government sponsored health insurance
within the organized labor movement became less urgent with
the growth of voluntary health insurance through collective
bargaining. Enrollment in private insurance for hospital
bills (first priority) rose from 32 million people in 1945
to 105 million in 1955, and to 175 million people in 1969
(88 percent of the civilian population). In 1957, private
health insurance premiums were valued at nearly $6 billion;
by 1967 they were near $17 billion, of which over $10 billion
flowed through commercial (profit) companies, and the bal-
ance through the nonprofit Blue Cross (hospital bills), Blue
Shield (medical bills) and lesser plans. [55]
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Efforts during the Eisenhower administration were con
centrated on building on the apparent success of private
health insurance. Health financing proposals of this period
were designed to recognize a public-private mix of funds,
with the public funds reserved as far as possible for the
poor. Private health insurance companies were envisioned
as being the third-party payer of medical bills for the
middle class, while the existing system of federal grants to
the states would provide medical care for those on public
assistance. Thus, ideally, most of the population would have
at least some of their health expenses covered. Federal
grants to states for payment to hospitals, doctors and other
providers of medical care for health services given to public
assistance recipients were $51.3 million in fiscal year
1949-50. With the added increment of federal grants for
vendor payments under the Social Security Administration, the
federal share rose to $311.9 million in 1954-55 and to $492.7
million in 1959-60. [56]
Extending federal grants for public assistance
recipients, however, does nothing to encourage the health
insurance industry to address the real problem of providing
reasonably comprehensive health insurance plans at an
affordable price. During this period, a major flaw --
deficient coverage -- began to emerge from the impressive,
but misleading, rise in private insurance enrollment figures.
In a study of families spending $500 or more on health
services in 1953, half had insurance coverage for less than
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20 percent of their medical expenses. And taking expendi-
tures as a whole, only 3 percent of the families with health
care expenses could be reimbursed for as much as 80 percent
of their bills. [57] Thus, a significant inadequacy in
coverage was emerging and, indeed, according to Rosemary
Stevens, "in no year yet (1971) have private health insurance
plans managed to cover more than a third of the total medi-
cal bill of private patients." [58] As health care costs
continued to inflate -- from an average expenditure of $84
per capita in 1950, to $149 in 1960 (and to $250 in 1967) [59]
-- the spiraling pattern became increasingly clear: increased
costs -- offset by an increase in premiums and decrease in
coverage -- increased out-of-pocket expenditure, for both
insurance and medical bills, consuming an ever increasing
proportion of incomes, and particularly low and fixed
incomes. By 1960 the plight of the poor and aged was again
recognized sufficiently to foster passage of the Kerr-Mills
Act, a temporary holding point until the passage of Medicare
and Medicaid in 1965.
The fallacies and deficiencies of private health
insurance are inherent and seem self-sustaining. It is
becoming increasingly clear that the health insurance in-
dustry cannot, of its own, provide an essentially social or
public utility service. Insurance as a business depends on
a realistic balance between premium income and benefit
expenditures, estimated on the basis of actuarial risk. On
this basis, the healthier person is the better 'risk' for
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health insurance, as he is for life insurance, or as the man
with a safe driving record is for automobile insurance. A
social service, on the other hand, should be designed to
provide services for all, including those who need them
most -- in this context, the highest insurance 'risk'. It
is not intended to portray the health insurance industry as
made up solely of individual private insurance plans.
Millions of Americans are covered by group plans negotiated
by large employers and/or unions. Those fortunate enough to
have access to a group plan are covered for whatever the plan
covers and usually at a reasonable cost to the employee. [60]
In some states private group plans are available but the
costs are usually prohibitive with respect to lower-middle
and lesser income families. As costs continue to increase,
many of these plans become fraught with coverage gaps or
exclusions, and most are of only marginal value in 'cata-
strophic' illnesses. According to a 1973 study by Cancer
Care, Inc. and the National Cancer Foundation, Inc., a
catastrophic illness can reduce a middle-income family to
poverty in less than two years. The study indicated that
the average cost of such an illness was $21,718; eighty-four
percent of the families reported costs exceeding $10,000, and
thirty percent had expenses between $25,000 and $50,000.
Only thirty-nine percent received medical or health insurance
payments in excess of $10,000. [61]
The health insurance industry has no capability to
control the costs of health care. This fact in turn renders
52

the industry incapable of influencing improvements in health
care organizational and operational efficiency or quality of
care. Even though they have met with little success, the
non-profit Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans have occasionally
tried to institute firmer cost controls. Most insurers,
however, seem content to simply raise premiums (and/or reduce
coverage) to cover charges as they climb relentlessly higher.
[62] The Blue Cross-Blue Shield efforts have failed because
the medical professions effectively control the managing
boards of these plans. Hospital representatives are a
majority or near majority on the boards of all seventy-five
Blue Cross plans across the country. Even the Blue Cross
trademark, an asset in selling insurance, has been owned for
years by the American Hospital Association and is granted by
them to insurance carriers. The situation with the Blue
Shield plans is similar. The Blue Shield boards are dominated
by physicians and the plans must be approved by the appro-
priate medical societies. The fee schedules and administration
of Shield plans are proposed by either the medical society or
a committee on which physicians constitute a majority, and
are then approved by physician-dominated boards. The medical
professions essentially control the plans in return for their
participation. Indeed, the Blue Cross-Blue Shield arrange-
ments, as most voluntary health insurance plans, seem
better designed to protect the interests of the providers of
health care than to protect the patient-users. [63]
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Competition is usually a force that leads us to expect
better products or services at the same or less cost. Compe-
tition in the health insurance industry is not directed towards
these ends, however, for the industry cannot offer better care
at competitive prices, nor can it influence physicians and
hospitals in this direction. Thus this industry's competition
is vested in marketing techniques which result in such schemes
as 'experience rating'. By limiting a health insurance plan
to people in a 'safer' or low-risk group, the insurer can
offer the same plan at a lower premium; premiums can be lower
because the company's experience indicates that it will pay
fewer benefits to this group. But the lower premium isn't
offered because the group will receive health care at a lower
cost; it is offered because the group has been singled out as
low-risk on a statistical basis. As premiums go down for low-
risk groups, they increase for everyone else. The net result
is exclusion of more and more people by ineffective coverage
or prohibitive cost and, indeed, these are the very people
most in need of health insurance.
Another inherent disadvantage of voluntary health
insurance is the insurer's retention of funds for 'overhead'
(high salaries, advertising costs, sales commissions, general
and administrative expenses) and corporate profits. In 1969
the industry retained 49.2 percent of the premiums from
individual policies. For the country as a whole, both group
and private policies, the commercial carriers kept 17 percent
of all premiums paid to them. [64] These figures and the
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controversy itself have changed little over the past twenty
years. Findings of a committee commissioned by the senate
to study voluntary plans showed that retention charges for
Blue Cross in 1949 were 15 percent; Blue Shield, 21 percent;
and that commercial companies retained 20 percent of the
premiums for group insurance and 45 percent of the individ-
ual policy premiums. [65]
Excepting comprehensive prepaid group plans, the
vast majority of all health insurance plans are still tied
to the fee-for-service principle that pays each provider for
each service to each patient. It is this principle that
tends to allow each physician and each hospital to set them-
selves up as independent businesses, with no definitive
budgetary constraints, and with little incentive to organize
with other physicians and hospitals to offer more compre-
hensive, better-organized and improved care. Private
health insurers do not seem mentally prepared or physically
capable of violating this principle so sacred to the medical
profession -- and so historically detrimental to the public.
2 . Medicare and Medicaid
Experiences with Medicare and Medicaid have shown
that the development of payment systems for health care is
politically as well as socially important. The argument is
a familiar one. If physicians and hospitals respond to
demands for adequate and efficient health services without
direct government controls or incentives, then only health
insurance is necessary. If, on the other hand, the health
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care providers seem unable to respond with more effective
services, even to the increased demand generated through
more generous insurance benefits, then direct government
action may prove socially desirable and politically neces-
sary. It is here -- in the response of a largely private
health service system to massive infusions of public funds --
that the experiences of Medicare and Medicaid have proven so
important.
The federal government took over no hospitals or
other facilities, nor does it directly employ any doctors
under Medicare. The same is true with respect to the state
governments under Medicaid. The new system was thus not
socialized medicine in the sense of creating a nationalized,
governmental service. As third-party reimbursement plans,
both Medicare and Medicaid imitated the private insurance
system. Physicians continue to practice as they did before.
They accept Medicare patients into their private offices or
in hospitals and the billing mechanisms are similar to those
for other, nongovernment, types of health insurance. The
doctors merely fill in a different form from that usually
requested for patients covered by private health insurance,
and continue to be paid on a fee-for-service basis.
The real significance in Medicare lay not in the
doctor's office, nor in the hospital, but in the administra-
tive structure set up between the federal government and the
health providers. The legislation broke down medical services
into two separately-administered sectors, those connected
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with hospital care and those primarily concerned with physi-
cian services. Under Medicare part A (hospital insurance),
groups of hospitals, clinics and extended care facilities
(nursing homes) are able either to deal directly with the
Social Security Administration for their payments, or to
nominate an organization (subject to government approval) to
act as a 'fiscal intermediary'. The functions of the fiscal
intermediary as defined in the law include: reimbursing pro-
viders for their services; providing consultative services to
hospitals and other participating agencies to help them set
up the appropriate records systems; establishing channels of
communication and information for providers of care and the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; and auditing
records. [66] The fiscal intermediary accepted functions
which would otherwise have had to be established by vastly
expanding the Social Security Administration's district
offices
.
The use of private fiscal agents rather than govern-
ment regional or district offices was logical in that the
latter had no experience in handling hospital and medical
claims. But the result of the legislation was to entrench
Medicare firmly into the structures of private health insur -
ance
. The great majority of hospitals (6,876 of 7,906)
nominated the Blue Cross Association as their intermediary
through their membership in the American Hospital Association
Over half of the clinics and extended care facilities also
selected the Blue Cross Association; the remainder selected
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commercial insurance companies; a few facilities chose to
deal directly with the government. As a result, the seventy-
five local Blue Cross plans, together with twelve other
principle private intermediaries, became agents of a major
government health program.
A similar pattern was followed for Medicare part B
(medical insurance) , although the private insurance agents
were termed 'carriers' rather than intermediaries, and the
choice was made not by the providers of care but by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The majority
(33 of 49) of the part B carriers so designated are Blue
Shield plans. Each carrier covers a particular geographical
area, usually a state. Part B carriers are responsible for
making payments for physician and other services from the
national supplementary medical insurance trust fund which, in
turn, draws its income from monthly contributions from those
sixty-five and over, and from the government. This channeling
of public funds through the private sector was one of the
major features of the new two-part Medicare program and it
became one of its major headaches in terms of oversight and
regulation.
In terms of provider acceptance, however, the program
was an immediate success. Medicare itself, once passed, was
rapidly absorbed into the physician's accepted and environ-
mental structure of office and hospital, based as it was on
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preexisting insurance patterns and on the payment of physicians
according to their fees in private practice.
The amount and the method of paying for physician
services are crucial questions in the establishment and effec-
tive operation of any government sponsored system of health
financing. By adopting the system of private intermediaries
and carriers, Medicare avoided long discussions and potential
confrontations with physician organizations on standard
methods and amounts of reimbursement for services. Instead
of a national professional group or local groups negotiating
over fee scales, capitation fees or contracts with the Social
Security Administration, open-ended responsibility was dele-
gated to the participating private insurance organizations to
pay fees which seemed reasonable. Instead of a public organi-
zation setting the relative value of an office visit to a
physician, the prevailing fee customs remained. Fee setting
itself rested on the integrity of the medical profession and,
indeed, in about 96 percent of cases, Medicare has paid the
fees charged by physicians. [67]
The intermediaries and carriers also welcomed the
arrangements. The board chairman of the National Association
of Blue Shield Plans, a practicing physician, commended the
framers of the bill in 1965 for their "keen understanding" of
the role of voluntary health insurance organizations in the
implementation of the Medicare program, for recognition of
Medicare part B as the antithesis of socialized medicine,
and for allowing the aged population to continue in accustomed
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patterns of payment. [68] For the government and the public,
these arrangements would provide a direct challenge to the
effectiveness of the private insurance sector as a vehicle
for national medical insurance, and to physicians as con-
trollers of medical services.
The impact of Medicare on individual physicians was
not one of federal control but of increased professional
flexibility. Physicians were now free to see elderly pa-
tients without concern that the patients would be impover-
ished by submitting to treatment, or that their own services
would go unremunerated. The value of such services to the
patients is inestimable in terms of the effect of the ser-
vices themselves, and the reduction in anxiety of people
faced with the threat of an extended and expensive illness.
But there were two related impacts of the system on the
responsibility and behavior patterns of physicians. One
was that under Medicare a group of persons who had been poor
in their ability to purchase medical services suddenly
became comparatively affluent. The other lay in the respon-
sibility of organized groups of physicians to review the
appropriateness of fees on behalf of fiscal intermediaries.
Medicare had been introduced to protect the incomes
of the elderly. But since physicians were encouraged through
the new system to charge for care of the elderly on the same
basis. as they charged other more prosperous members of the
population, Medicare, supported by developing Medicaid
programs for the poor, evened up the financial status of the
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population. And a by-product of Medicare was to support and
increase the incomes of physicians. By 1970, part B of
Medicare, 90 percent of which is for physician services to
the elderly, was paying out amounts which averaged $7,000 per
physician. [69]
Fee review was left largely to the carriers, just as
hospital reimbursement, which was on the similar basis of
"reasonable costs," was left to the part A intermediaries.
The Social Security Administration has shown reluctance to
pressure the carriers to standardize the concept of usual
and customary fees; the crucial cost decisions remain in the
private sector, with the government acting as a reimbursement
agency.
The idea of customary charges was thus translated
(subject to review by carriers for obvious abuses), in the
absence of effective controls, into the individual actions of
300,000 physicians and became the key to developing the costs
of Medicare. This was true not only in the case of physician
fees but also in the determination of hospital and nursing
home utilization and in the prescription of diagnostic tests,
drugs, and other services (part A). Instead of the develop-
ment of relatively independent and effective local agencies
for the administration of Medicare, with strong physician
participation and leadership, Medicare evolved swiftly into
an additional source of cost coverage and income to medical
providers; and then in turn to congressional and public
anxiety about the apparent lack of administrative responsibility
for an increasingly expensive medical program.
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Physician fees increased from an annual average of
3 percent between 1956 and 1965 to an apparent rise of 6.5
percent between June 1965 and June 1967. [70] In part to
meet the rising expenditures the monthly premium paid by the
elderly for services under part B of Medicare was increased
from the original $3 in 1966, to $4 as of April 1968, and
again to $5.30 in July 1970; these sums in each case being
matched from general federal revenues. Including the first
$50 which a patient pays for care under part B, the person
sixty-five years or over had to pay $113.60 a year (1970)
before receiving any services, compared with $86 in 1966.
A list of all payments made to physicians of $25,000
or more under Medicare was compiled by the Social Security
Administration for the Senate Finance Committee, with the
amounts attributed to account numbers (not physicians'
names). There were 4,284 such physicians in 1968, excluding
those known to be in group practice. Of these, eighteen
received $150,000 or more from Medicare, in one instance for
treating fewer than 350 beneficiaries. [71] Such figures
were produced together with other testimony indicating abuse
of Medicare (so-called gang visits when a doctor would sweep
through a nursing home and charge Medicare for a visit to
each patient) and the development of higher fees under
Medicare than under the carrier's own Blue Shield plans. [72]
A small but significant minority of physicians was clearly
abusing Medicare. Moreover the private carriers, which were
officially the government's agents, appeared to be doing
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little to correct abuses, and in many respects were them-
selves inefficient and wasteful. The tone of the Finance
Committee hearings and staff report was one of shock and of
the need for a much more forceful role by the federal govern-
ment in administering Medicare.
The focus on cost controls by the Congress was an
inevitable reaction to a large governmental program which
constantly overran its budget estimates. For example, the
estimate made in 1965 for part A costs in 1970 was 3.1
billion; this was steadily revised upward to $5.8 billion in
1970; part B costs, meanwhile, doubled between 1967 and 1971.
[73] Costs themselves, however, are only one element in a
complex system for health services. Local and national
public medical review committees (had congress legislated
them into existence) would presumably have been expected to
evaluate the performance of the system in efficiently meet-
ing the needs of the beneficiaries. For hospitals and
extended care facilities (under part A), the Medicare legis-
lation required "utilization review" procedures as a condition
of participation -- that is, a review of the use of the hos-
pital (or nursing home) and hospital services by individual
medical patients. Each institution had to establish a
utilization review committee which was supposed to consider
both the medical necessity of services and the use of health
facilities
.
The requirement and establishment of utilization
review committees was not the same, however, as putting them
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into effective operation. As yet, few efforts have been made
to push for their development as crucial evaluating agencies
in the operation of Medicare. Instead of welcoming the oppor-
tunity to review the effectiveness of services, there has been
local physician resistance to committee influence over the
individual's prerogatives to practice medicine. A survey of
hospitals by the Social Security Administration in 1968
found that almost half of the hospitals were not reviewing
any admissions, although this is a statutory requirement; [74]
mechanisms for extended care facilities were even less
developed. Part A intermediaries have thus been reluctant
(as have their part B counterparts) to exercise meaningful
control in matters involving their traditional relationships
with health care providers.
An important and concurrent aspect of developments
in Medicare, has been the rapid rise and fall in expectations
of Medicaid. Medicaid was set up as a program of federal
grants to states for the expansion and consolidation of
existing scattered programs for vendor payments for medical
care on behalf of persons on public assistance, and for those
who were not on assistance but whose financial situation could
not withstand major medical expenses. The latter had been
termed medically indigent in the Kerr-Mills program for the
aged, established in 1960. The problems described in the
administration of Medicare concurrently beset the Medicaid
program. Federal payments to the states for medical assist-
ance increased from $555 million in fiscal year 1965 (before
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the impact of Medicaid) to $2.8 billion in 1970, with parallel
increases by state and local governments. [75] In an atmos-
phere of growing public and congressional concern over the
costs of Medicare and Medicaid, the Senate Finance Committee
held hearings in 1967. The committee chairman, Sen. Russell
Long, reiterated his concern in further hearings in 1969:
"We want the Medicaid program to provide help to
people who need it and we want the Medicare program to
look after the medical needs of our senior citizens. We
want that care to be of high quality. But, we think it
should be provided on a basis that is efficient and econom-
ical, not on a basis which is wasteful and extravagant."
[76]
The Medicare program is a landmark in that, while
limited both in population coverage and benefits, it
established a system of compulsory national health insurance
for the first time in our history. A significant by-product
of Medicare is that it brought us nearer to the realization
that something more fundamental in our national health care
system must be altered. That something is the "free-
enterprise" safeguard clause which congress, in deference to
organized medicine, wrote into the Medicare law, forbidding
the government to "exercise any supervision or control over
the practice of medicine, or the manner in which medical
services are provided." This clause rendered Titles XVIII
(Medicare) and XIX (Medicaid) as virtually open-ended
commitments to finance medical services for the aged and
65

poor, from both Social Security contributions and general
tax money, with no safeguard for the public. Enshrined in
the law were the aged principles of paying "reasonable costs"
rather than fixed prices, to hospitals, and "reasonable" or
"customary fees," rather than standardized fees, to physicians;
and to do so through an existing inadequate and indifferent
private health insurance structure (Medicare) and through
state and local welfare mechanisms (Medicaid)
.
3. The Federal Health Bureaucracy
The time seems long passed in the United States when
it could be debated whether or not there should be federal
government intervention in health care and services. Govern-
ment involvement in the development of health care personnel
and facilities, educational institutions, payment plans for
selected population groups, and medical research is substan-
tial and important to our national well-being. Under the
impact of Medicare, Medicaid, and other medical related
legislation of the 1960s, federal expenditures on medical
programs grew from $2.9 billion in 1959-60, to $15.1 billion
in 1968-69, and to $20.6 billion in 1970-71. Aggregating all
public expenditures, federal, state and local, the amount
represents more than one-third of the national total expendi-
tures on medical care and health facilities. [77]
One might expect that federal expenditures of this
magnitude -- ten percent of all federal outlays -- should be
accomplished by careful planning, programming, budgeting and
control. Such is not the case for two traditional and
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somewhat related reasons. The first is the stigma of
'socialized medicine' attached to overt federal controls in
the health care field, so carefully cultured and propagan-
dized over the years by medical societies, associations and
related lobby groups. The other is the public's perceived
role of the federal government in common welfare spending.
Until recently the typical federal assistance program,
whether for land grant colleges, highways, vocational train-
ing, crippled children services, or vendor medical payments
under public assistance, did not involve an expressly defined
national purpose -- that is, there was not the recently
introduced program or objective approach to planning and
budgeting. Federal programs were designed to support state
or local efforts, financed through formula and other grants,
with federal advice but not control. Medicaid is an example
of the influence of this assistance philosophy; it was
designed to aid the states rather than to establish a
federal health care program for the medically indigent.
Another clear example of this attitude is the establishment
of neighborhood health centers. Whereas we recognize the
dire need of ghetto minorities for access to both preventive
and curative care, the government provides these centers by
authorizing grants for proposed Community Action Programs
under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-452).
The action programs are ostensibly designed for job training
and other aspects of community development but provide a
convenient and acceptable device for providing health care.
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A direct result of the historically weak federal role
has been the diffusion of health subsidies over a patchwork
of legislation dealing with federal health assistance and
service programs. Elements of federal action are now scattered
across 221 different government agencies and departments.
The largest of these is the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (DHEW) which has responsibility for over 70 per-
cent of the federal health dollar, including Medicare, Medic-
aid, and most of the recent health programs of the 1960s.
But even within DHEW there are major divisions, fragmentations,
rivalry and overlap resulting from an attitude of passive
federal administration, and of the development of health
services around a variety of social welfare programs. The
Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, the
highest-ranking spokesman on health within the government, is
connected only with the divisions carried over from the old
United States Public Health Service. As a result he is the
responsible executive for only 22 percent of the DHEW health
budget. Medicare, as a part of Social Security legislation,
is operated by the Social Security Administration, and
Medicaid, a public assistance program, by the separate
Social and Rehabilitation Service, which also administers a
number of maternal and child health services. Each program
is administered in its own sphere of operations, in the




Lack of coordination among federal departments and
offices is compounded by a lack of clear delineations in their
span of operations. The nature and number of programs mean
that there are constant problems of overlapping functions and
jurisdictions. Despite the coordination of various pieces of
legislation in the Health Manpower Act of 1968, as many as 14
separate federal departments and agencies are engaged in ad-
ministering programs for health training and education. [78]
Dr. James Shannon, former director of the National Institutes
of Health, estimated that in the Johnson administration alone,
Congress enacted 51 pieces of health related legislation,
administered through 400 different authorities. [79] Some of
the problems of overlap emerge in quite evident ways. The
Small Business Administration and the Hill-Burton program (in
DHEW) have in some instances made grants or loans to competing
hospitals in the same communities, with a resulting over-
expansion of hospital beds and duplication of facilities.
[80]
Congressional committee hearings and staff reports
are increasingly bearing out a near crisis of administrative
chaos. The combined effect of one piece of legislation after
another, poured into an uncoordinated health service system,
has been to produce a growing dysfunction in the operation
of our federal health establishment. Government 'grantsman-
ship' and 'subsidy-mania' through the private sector and
state and local mechanisms maintains a 'low profile' role of
federal participation but results in uncoordinated assistance
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programs proliferating without sense or direction. The
present situation is one of a need for a national policy,
objective, and program for health care (and for science,
urban planning, welfare, etc.) which will maintain sufficient
decentralization of services to enable utilization, while




IV. TRENDS (ALTERNATIVES) FOR THE FUTURE
A. HEALTH CARE IN OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED WESTERN COUNTRIES
As the time for debating federal government involvement
in health care is past, so is it likely that the historical
thesis that our health care problems will be solved in the
'market place' is increasingly anachronous . Although health
care providers often display individual entrepreneurial char-
acteristics, medical professionals and institutions, collec-
tively, appear a classic example of a discriminating monopoly;
a monopoly that varies prices according to income or demand
in order to get the most revenue from the largest number of
people. [81] The market place philosophy has consistently
been the position of the profession, the AMA and related
interest groups, and our experiences have just as consistently
belied it.
The inadequacies and inequities of our health care system
have not evolved uniquely to the United States; all have been
experienced before in other countries. It may be beneficial
to our perceptions of the subject to note, in resume, a few
basic facts about the organization of health care on a
national basis in some of these countries. [82] For clarity
it should first be stated that there are three basic methods
of paying physicians in national plans, sometimes used in
combination with each other:
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Fee -for -Service - a fee for each procedure, sometimes
paid by the patient subject to reimbursement, sometimes paid
by the government or an intermediary.
Capitation - a fixed annual payment for every person
on a doctor's list of patients (subscribers), regardless of
how often the patient sees his doctor. A variation is 'case
payment', a fixed sum paid only for persons who become ill
(receive care)
.
Salary - a fixed payment to the doctor, based not on
how many patients he sees, but on his professional rank and
the amount of time he devotes to practice.
Great Britain - National Health Insurance is adminis-
tered by the Department of Health and Social Security. Eighty
five percent of the cost is borne by the Government, with
contributions by workers and employers. It covers all resi-
dents, plus most visitors. Physicians operating on a panel
system, receive a fixed schedule of fees from National Health
Service for special services. General practitioners are
reimbursed on a capitation basis. The National Health
Service runs a system of national hospitals, directly admin-
istered by the Department of Health, with their personnel,
including doctors, on salary. Health centers, clinics, and
extended-care facilities are operated by county councils.
The National Health Service, in effect since 1948,
entitles everyone in the British Isles to health care, fi-
nanced principally by the Government. A general practitioner
receives a capitation payment of about $2.50 a year for every
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patient registered with him, regardless of how much treatment
he gives the patient. Ninety-seven percent of British resi-
dents are registered with National Health Service doctors,
though they are free to see doctors privately outside the
national system. They are also free to choose their doctors,
although, in practice, they tend to register with the doctors
most conveniently available to home or place of work. The
physician usually operates from his own office and with his
own staff. He is encouraged by extra pay incentives, to work
with groups of physicians, but he is not compelled to do so.
The British doctor is rewarded for doing things which are
considered socially useful. He gets extra pay for treating
a person over sixty-five, for making night calls, for treat-
ing transients, for providing maternity care, for giving pre-
ventive care and for moving to a remote area short of
physicians
.
Because of British tradition rather than because of
National Health Service, once the patient goes to the hos-
pital he is out of the hands of his family doctor. In the
nationalized hospital, the system is different. The inde-
pendent physician paid by capitation is replaced by a fully
salaried staff in publicly operated institutions, all
integrated within a single system and with easy transfer from
one to the other for specialized services.
France - The national health insurance fund operates
under the general supervision of the Ministry of Social
Affairs. Management control is exercised through sixteen
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regional Social Security Fund offices which have authority to
negotiate hospital and medical fee schedules with regional
professional associations. All wage and salary earners,
farmers, craftsmen, self-employed and retired persons, are
covered. Aliens working in France are entitled to the same
benefits as citizens.
All doctors participate in the program. The rates of
payment are fixed on a fee-for-service basis by agreement
between the Social Security Administration and the medical
associations. All public hospitals and a number of private
institutions approved by the Social Security Administration
participate. Health insurance covers seventy-five percent
of outpatient medical and dental bills, eighty percent of
medical fees, laboratory tests and hospitalization, and
seventy-five percent of most pharmaceutical prescriptions.
West Germany - Health insurance is under the general
supervision of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and
is administered through state insurance offices. There are
about 2,000 local, occupational, and other funds, managed by
elected representatives of insured persons and employers and
organized into state and national federations. It is
compulsory for all wage and salary workers below a certain
earnings level to be enrolled in a health fund, not neces-
sarily a public one.
Doctors are associated with individual funds and are
paid by them on a fee-for-service basis. The most common
criterion for payment is a nationwide fee schedule, arrived
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at by the social security carriers and the organization of
insurance doctors, and subject to approval of the Ministry.
Hospitals are maintained by public authorities (state and
local governments, universities, and insurance institutions),
and by private organizations (churches, trade unions, and
private owners [in the case of sanitariums]), with national
subsidies available.
Eighty-five percent of the West German population
is covered by the compulsory system (all workers whose
income falls below a certain minimum, most pensioners, and
many self-employed persons) . The well-to-do take care of
themselves, and the unemployed rely on charity. The system
is administered through some 2,000 sick funds, organized by
locality or by factory. (There are also sixteen special
funds which offer greater benefits for those who want to
travel first-class by paying higher contributions.) Employers
and employees share the premiums equally. The patient is free
to choose his doctor, and the doctor may not make any charge
to the patient (except when the patient insists on some pro-
cedure which the doctor considers medically unnecessary and
therefore unchargeable to insurance) . Drugs require only a
small nominal charge per prescription to discourage over-
utilization. It is a fee-for-service system, based on a
voluminous schedule of fees for specific services. (It
includes, for example, what the doctor may charge for a tele-
phone conversation with his patient.) The role of the
Government is to establish the minimum coverage, the maximum
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premiums (currently eleven percent of wages) , and maximum
fees. The rest is basically left to negotiation between the
insurance doctors and the insurance funds. This system, in
which the doctors' association itself handles the distribution
of the money and sets individual fees after negotiating lump-
sum contracts with the insurance funds, is unique. The
doctors have an incentive to police their own colleagues
because they are all sharing a lump sum negotiated with the
insurance fund and limited by the government ceiling on
premiums
.
West Germany's health-care program is concentrated
in the doctor's office. There is little competition from
hospital outpatient departments. Hospital doctors may see
insurance cases during their off hours in the hospital, but
only when referred by the private practitioner. A West
German's insurance covers an unlimited stay in the hospital,
which is generally run by the local government and has its
own staff of salaried physicians.
Sweden - The medical insurance plan is supervised by
the National Social Insurance Board under the general super-
vision of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Insurance is
compulsory (children under sixteen are covered by their
parents' insurance). Foreign workers and other foreign
residents who are registered for census purposes are entitled
to the same benefits as citizens. The National Board of Health
and Welfare supervises the medical personnel, the hospitals,
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and the pharmacies, and has direct control over the state
mental hospitals, the state pharmaceutical laboratory, and
the state institutions for forensic medicine. Most hospitals
are owned and operated by public authorities, primarily at
the county level. The regional social insurance offices pay
seventy-five percent of the physician's services up to certain
limits listed in published fee schedules approved by the
Government after negotiation with the Swedish Medical
Association. Individuals have a free choice among doctors.
Everyone sixteen and older, with an income exceeding
a certain minimum, pays an annual insurance premium, based
on his income and the area where he lives (to take into
account variations in costs among regions) . For this pre-
mium he and his dependents receive benefits amounting to
seventy-five percent of the official fee for each medical
procedure. The fee schedule is relatively short and simple
as such schedules go. The patient pays the doctor, gets a
receipt, and the regional insurance office reimburses him for
seventy-five percent of it. This, it should be noted, is
one of the least generous formulas in Europe, but it reflects
the drastic shortage of physicians in Sweden and the desire
to discourage overutilization. There has been such a
scarcity of doctors in Sweden that physicians are booked far
in advance. In practice, due to the competition for care,
average reimbursement is substantially less than seventy-
five percent. The doctors who practice privately (1,200 of
the total of 9,200) set their own fees, but reimbursement is
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still on the basis of the official fee. Thus, some patients
get as little as fifty percent of their doctors' bills
refunded.
Hospitalization, under the Swedish insurance system,
is free in public wards, as are all needed surgery, medical
treatment, laboratory and X-ray tests, and drugs. There are
additional personally paid charges for patients who want
semi-private or private rooms. There are also some surviving
private hospitals, where the patient pays all costs, but so
few are willing to do so that private hospitals now represent
fewer than three percent of beds in Swedish general hospitals
As in Britain, when a patient goes to the hospital, he loses
contact with his family doctor and comes under the care of a
salaried hospital physician. This is more a product of
tradition than of the insurance system. In fact, Swedish
medical authorities, concerned about the results of this
separation, have started rotating general practitioners
through the hospitals to catch up with new techniques.
The Netherlands - A national health protection pro-
gram was codified in 1966 as the Health Insurance Act. The
act provides compulsory coverage for wage-earners, the aging,
and the disabled, paid largely by employers through a 7.2
percent payroll tax. It is not a universal system. About
half the population is insured compulsorily , and another
twenty percent voluntarily. The remaining thirty percent --
including pricipally the rural population, the very poor, and
the very rich -- must depend on their own resources, on volun
tary insurance, or on charity.

For the 70 percent of the Dutch population who are
covered, the program is administered under general regulations
set by the government whereby local insurance plans contract
with hospitals and physicians. Doctors are paid on a capi-
tation basis -- each doctor receives a fixed annual amount
for every person registered with him for care. The benefi-
ciary chooses his own family doctor, but he can only see a
specialist to whom he is referred by his doctor. His
insurance covers hospital treatment up to one year per ill-
ness, plus drugs and a variety of other benefits, and dental
care under some conditions.
Canada - Canada is included here, briefly, because
it recently instituted a system of national health insurance,
likely influenced by the highly successful Windsor Medical
Services group plan, sponsored by the Essex County, Ontario,
Medical Society. [83] Canadian health insurance operates
under a joint federal -provincial system. The Department of
National Health and Welfare shares costs and provides con-
sultative services. The Federal Government provides about
half of the medical insurance costs of the participating
provinces. The basic aim of the provincial systems is
universal coverage of all residents, with a waiting period
for non-residents. Most public general hospitals have been
approved for inclusion in the hospital insurance system.
Selected private hospitals providing special and convalescent
care have been approved for payment on a contract basis in




Communist Countries - For contrast, a few general
words on the Communist system may be appropriate. This
system, of course, is the outcome not of public consensus but
of a dictatorial political party ideology. In the Communist
bloc countries a Ministry of Health operates a network of
hospitals and dispensaries. Physicians and other profession-
als are on salary, although they can supplement their incomes
by private moonlighting. Health care is financed from the
state budget, and patients pay only a share of drug costs.
Patients are assigned to the nearest facilites (or they can,
at their own expense, have recourse to the moonlighters).
For the salaried doctors, incentive payments are
closely geared to the goals of the regime. For example, a
bonus may be paid to a physician in an industrial location
if absenteeism at the factory is low. This encourages pre-
vention of illness; it also sometimes encourages doctored
reports to underestimate the extent of illness. The doctors,
a large number of them women, are relatively poorly paid --
often earning little more than skilled workers. Individual
practice has virtually disappeared. It is not an ideal situ-
ation for doctors; it does, however, despite long waits,
excessive paper work, and other inconveniences, serve the
community. Some eighty percent of the 230 million Soviet
citizens visit their polyclinics every year for free care and
check-ups. Though unattractive, it may be likely that no
other system would have worked as well in a country which
started with such a shortage of medical resources. This may
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help explain why the Soviet system tends to be emulated, at
times, by under-developed countries in their early emergence
stages
.
This summary of systems in other countries is not intend-
ed to imply that any part of any other system might be
appropriately imported to the United States. Each system is
an outgrowth of its own national history, culture and unique
experience. Nor is it intended to evaluate any system
relative to any other; each has its own significant and pe-
culiar problems and continues to undergo adjustment through
the scrutiny of its public constituency. The essential
point here is, that each of these systems (except the Com-
munist experience) represents an instance where the existing
health care system of a nation-state was designed, not in the
market place, but in the arena of public policy.
Two recent quotations emerge as particularly germane to
this discussion of public health care systems. In Sweden,
where the political struggle for the present system was a
vigorous and sometimes bitter one, Dr. Arne Ekengren, vice-
president of the Swedish Medical Association, told an
interviewer from Medical Economics :
"Most doctors and virtually the entire population are
now happy with the national health insurance program. . .We
Swedes can be stubborn at times, and that includes physi-
cians. However, we are not unreasonable people, and, after
a while, we began to see the reason for national health
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insurance. For example, one of the arguments against
the program was that two-thirds of the population was
covered by voluntary health insurance. However, we now
know that the people who really needed full health
coverage -- the poor and the people on the economic border-
line between the poor and the fairly well-off -- didn't
get it. Today they do." [84]
In order to observe some other nations' health care
systems first hand, the Senate Health Subcommittee went on
a two-week fact-finding mission to Europe and the Middle East
in the summer of 1971. They visited Great Britain, Denmark,
Sweden, and Israel; they talked at length with doctors, health
officials, hospital administrators, insurance experts, teach-
ers, students, government officials, and the citizens in gen-
eral. The chairman of the subcommittee summarized his findings
thusly
:
"Most of us in America have been led to believe that
health care is a disaster in Europe. We believe that
the people in England and other countries cannot get
health care and are unhappy with their systems. We
believe that the people don't get to choose their doc-
tors and that the government tells their doctors what
to do. We believe that costs are out of control in
Europe, worse than in America. We believe that the
people are treated coldly by big organizations and have




"From what I saw, these things are simply false;
they are myths that we have been taught by those who
fear they will lose their high incomes or their freedom
of choice if America were to change its health care
system.
"The fact is, while most Americans are angry and
frustrated about health care, most Englishmen, Danes,
Swedes, and Israelis are not. The vast majority of
citizens in the countries we visited describe their
health care system with pride, and no major political
party in these countries would dream of trying to repeal
the system. Indeed, many of the people we talked to
were horrified to learn that Americans have to worry
about whether they can afford health care. The fact
is also that while the federal government in America
has fought organized medicine to pass such programs as
Medicare and Medicaid, in Europe government and organ-
ized medicine have entered into a constructive partner-




B. MILESTONE: THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION SPECIAL REPORT
The pattern of medical care in the United States ten or
twenty years hence may not be one of federal domination of
health care and services, in the sense of a monolithic or
centralized governmental health service, as in Great Britain.
Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the key to changing
our present health care system is inevitably in the future
actions of the federal government. The Medicare program
stands as a landmark in the decade of the 1960s in that,
though limited in scope, it placed the stamp of official
recognition on the need for a system of national health
insurance. Subsequent experiences with Medicare and with
the Medicaid program are no less a part of that landmark.
We have started the 1970s with what must be considered
at least a milestone in awareness, insight, and foresight
concerning our present and future health care system: The
Special Report and Recommendations by the Carnegie Commission
on Higher Education. [86] The commission, recognizing an
urgent need for early action in the field of health manpower
education, issued a separate special report on this subject
in October, 1970, two years ahead of its planned final
report. The commission carefully considered the viewpoints
of some observers who disputed the existence of a current
or impending shortage of physicians. These observers argued
that:
- The real problem is the maldistribution and ineffi-
cient use of physicians.
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- The ratio of other health workers to doctors and
dentists is increasing rapidly.
- The work of the health care team will soon be far
more effectively coordinated than at present.
- Physician's associates and assistants, with less
prolonged training than the fully certified doctor
receives, will increasingly take over some of the
physician's duties so that his time will be released
for the use of his highest skills.
The commission recognized that some changes were occurring
but concluded that: "there is no question, in our judgement,
that an acute shortage exists ," [87] and also: "The most
serious shortages of professional personnel in any major
occupation group in the United States are in the health
services . " [88]
Throughout the commission's report of reforms and goals
to be achieved, and in its many recommendations, the primary
theme is the need for expansion of health manpower education
The commission believes that medical entrant places can be
expanded by as much as 38 to 44 percent in existing and
developing institutions. Some of the recommendations are:
- Acceptance of enough qualified applicants to fill
all entrant places.
- A 50 percent increase in medical school entrant places




Reduction of medical school programs from four to three
years between the B.A. and M.D. degrees by 1973-74.
The estimated number of entrant places would be in-
creased by an estimated 4,500 by 1976-77, a 31 percent
increase. (Reduction of the academic program time
involves the commission's recommendation to integrate
the B.A. and M.D. curricula, and eliminate academic




Provide a degree between B.A. and M.D. degrees such
as Bachelor of Medicine. Foster physician associate/
assistant programs.
Reduction of time between the B.A. degree and full
practice from 8 to 6 years. (Reduce internship and
residency from four years to three)
.
Establish nine recommended new schools to provide 900
to 1,350 new entrant places.
Development of approximately 126 area health education
centers, affiliated with university health science
centers by 1980.
Expansion of the functions of university health science
centers in coordinating health manpower education and
in the development of improved health care delivery
systems in their regions.
Expansion of programs to increase manpower in all
health care allied and related fields.
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- Development of a voluntary national health service
corps
.
- A relatively low uniform national tuition policy for
institutions providing medical and dental education.
- Establishing an Educational Opportunity Bank for
medical and dental students.
- Appointment of a National Health Manpower Commission
to make a thorough study of changing patterns of
education and utilization of health manpower, with
particular reference to new types of allied health
workers, of changing patterns of health care deliv-
ery, and of the feasibility of national licensing
requirements for all health manpower.
Taken as a whole, the commission's report seemingly
rejects the sometimes posed theory that the effective use
of physician manpower depends primarily on a taut supply of
physicians
.
The commission quietly makes another observation which,
if implemented, may prove to be the most innovative change
in American medical education and health care delivery in
over sixty years. The commission notes that the Flexner
model, based on the German medical education system with
emphasis on biological research, has been the sole accepted
model in the United States since 1910. Although it has led
to great strides forward in quality of research and indi-
vidual practitioners, the Flexner, or research model, looks
inward to science in the medical school itself. It is a
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self-contained approach and consequently, has two weaknesses
in modern times: CI) it largely ignores health care delivery
outside the medical school and its own hospital, and (2) it
sets science in the medical school apart from science on the
general campus with a resulting duplication of effort. The
commission believes future efforts should be devoted to pro-
moting greater integration of medical education and the
nation's social needs. It writes favorably of two new models
presently emerging:
(1) The health care delivery model, where the medical
school, in addition to training, does research in health
care delivery, advises local hospitals and health authori-
ties, works with community colleges and comprehensive
colleges on the training of allied health personnel,
carries on continuing education for health personnel, and
generally orients itself to external service.
(2) The integrated science model, where most all of the
basic science (and social science) instruction is carried
on within the main campus (or other general campuses)
and not duplicated in the medical school, which provides
mainly clinical instruction. In this model (as in
England) , the medical school may be essentially a teaching
hospital; but this is not necessary -- it may, rather,
carry on all its 'Flexner' functions except the tradi-
tional first one or two years of science education. [89]
Although the commission is primarily concerned with
higher education, and their report emphasizes the importance
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of increased federal financing of health manpower education,
they also observe that:
- The federal government already supports most of the
costs of medical research. [90]
- The federal government collects about two-thirds of
all tax revenues and is in a position to rely much
more heavily on. . . . taxes than is feasible for state
and local governments.... and is in a much better
position to increase its expenditures on public
services. [91]
- A national health service corps should be developed
to bring improved health care service to low income
and rural areas of the nation. [92]
- Gradually, we are likely to shift toward a situation
in which health care is a public utility; and, the
government's role in protecting the health of the
population will inevitably become broader in scope.
[93]
- As a result of the Medicare and Medicaid programs,
the federal government is now far more heavily in-
volved in the financing of health care than ever
before; these programs are inefficient and excessively
expensive in that they only cover high-cost, high-risk
groups; and that, the great advantage of a comprehen-
sive national insurance system would be the inclusion
of all the good risks along with the poor risks, result
ing in much lower average costs. [94]
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- Health care is coming to be regarded not only as a
necessity but also as a right to which all persons are
entitled ; the trend toward ensuring the right to health
care is virtually certain to continue until all
Americans are guaranteed access to adequate care without
regard to means ; and that, increasingly, experts pre-
dict that the United States will adopt a national health
insurance system, perhaps within the decade of the
'70's . [95]
A final highlight of the commission's report is the
revelation of ostensible changes in long-standing policies
of two of the most influential medical professional associ-
ations. During the commission's studies the American Medical
Association (AMA) and the Association of American Medical
Colleges (AAMC) issued two joint statements [96] calling for
rapid expansion of medical school entrant places. These
statements additionally, though in general terms, embrace
other immediate steps and longer-range goals detailed in the
commission's report and recommendations. The commission was
apparently impressed with the significant import of these




C. NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE
The recent impetus for a system of national health insur-
ance creates a corresponding need for a practical explanation
of this concept. Historically, the movement first enjoyed
discernable support during the progressive era of 1908-13, as
a logical next step after enactment of workmen's compensation
legislation. It was next considered in parallel with the
Social Security Act and other social legislation of the
1930s, and became a full blown national issue from 1946-52.
Debate and consideration of the concept has been tradi-
tionally confused by a shroud of socio-political emotionalism,
Medical professional groups and societies, with quiet but
firm support from the drug and insurance industries, have
invoked the spectre of "socialized medicine" over most of
the health care legislation which they have opposed. This
use of loose and ambiguous terminology stands in sharp con-
trast to the medical establishment's insistence on precise
clarity of language in drafting legislation. [97] A
socialized medical system would place the government in
direct authority over four areas of medical care in addition
to existing public health operations, namely: production of
health care personnel; provision of medical facilities;
organization, administration and delivery of all health care
services; and payment of all medical expenses. The medical
care system within the armed forces is analogous to such a
system. A compulsory health insurance system concentrates
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on the payment area and a soundly financed one places the
government in the position of insurer, but it falls far
short of a strictly socialized system.
The government spends an estimated $7 billion annually
for purely socialized systems for the armed forces and
veterans, hospitalization for the tuberculous, the mentally
ill or retarded, and medical services for Indians. Other
aspects of American health care have increasingly been near-
socialized in the areas of public health, medical education
and training, facilities, and through federal grant and
subsidy systems for the expenses of medically indigent
groups. But the emotion- laden charge of "socialized medicine"
is raised to influence public attention away from the payment
aspect because a system of direct public funding of medical
expenses implies public responsibility, accountability,
standards and controls.
A simple definition of a national health insurance plan
could be, a system whereby the federal government would be-
come the health insurance carrier for the nation; or a
system wherein the government would provide identical
insurance coverage to all citizens for essential health care;
or a system wherein the government would issue a group
health insurance plan in which every citizen was a member.
To be made precise, any such definition then has to be
qualified according to the degree or extent of coverages --
service benefits, monetary benefits, population group --
designed into the plan. There are two basic approaches to
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designing health insurance plans, health service benefits or
cash indemnity benefits; and these reflect basic differences
in the philosophy of health insurance. The service benefit
approach is based on the conviction that in the event of
illness, the individual's need is for medical care rather
than for cash to help him purchase care. Service benefits
assure protection to the individual and eliminates the fin-
ancial barrier to the use of services specified in the plan.
On the other hand, the cash indemnity approach reflects the
application of traditional insurance principles to provide
protection against the costs of medical care. It sets a
monetary limit on the benefits for which the individual will
be reimbursed and contributes payment toward the cost of
services covered in the plan.
There are two distinguishing features which identify a
service benefits plan. One is the participating physician --
the physician who agrees to accept obligations in accordance
with the provisions of the plan. The other is the specified
upper limit of income; for subscribers within the limit no
extra billing is permitted and the fee schedule provides
full protection for the services included in the plan. The
more common cash indemnity plan lacks these features; while
there may be a fee schedule, there is no agreement between
physicians and the plan concerning either the fees or the
income level below which the fees might constitute full pay-
ment for services. Under such circumstances 'extra billing'
is the prerogative of the doctor; and the patient, regardless
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of income, does not know his degree of protection until he
needs (and receives) a service included in the plan.
The difference between service and cash benefit plans
is, in reality, not so clearly defined except for the
extremes described. A service plan acquires the character-
istics of a cash indemnity plan when a significant percent-
age of practicing physicians are non-participating -- have
not agreed to the plan. The plan subscribers who receive
services from these physicians may be subjected to extra
billing even though their incomes are below the specified
limit. Similarly, a service plan tends to become a cash
plan when the upper limit of the subscribers income is
specified so low that the majority of subscribers do not
receive service benefits. Hence, for most of the insured, the
plan is a cash indemnity policy since, beyond the stated
income limit, extra billing is permitted and the patient does
not learn the extent of his protection until he acquires medi-
cal services. It is also conceivable that a cash plan can
approach a service plan if an adequate number of physicians
agree to the fee schedule (participate) , and the upper limit
of income is high enough that a large majority of the sub-
scribers are not subject to extra billing.
Experiences with voluntary health insurance and the
Medicare and Medicaid programs have prompted a widely varying
series of related legislative proposals. From November, 1969
to August, 1970, five national health insurance plans were
presented to Congress and are currently receiving consideration
94

These proposals illustrate the spectrum of approaches,
described above, from service benefits to cash indemnity
benefits. Two proposals, the Reuther Plan (now the Kennedy
Health Security Program) and the Griffiths (AFL-CIO) Plan,
are service benefits government operated plans. [98] The
AMA Medicredit and Pettengill proposals are cash benefits
private insurance plans, and the Javits Bill represents a
compromise between the public and private, and service and
cash approaches. Table VI is a resume comparison of these
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V. 'CONCLUSION AND A CAVEAT TOR THE PUBLIC
The complexity of the current situation in health care
and medical services in the United States precludes defining
a problem or the issue. It is not merely a "shortage or
maldistribution of physicians;" nor a "dysfunction in the
organization, productivity and delivery" of health care;
nor "inadequate cost controls" or "ineffective payment plans."
It is each of these at once, inextricably set in a pattern of
social, professional and economic parochialisms and political
expediencies. There exists in America a generally excellent
(and well-publicized) health care capability and the potential
for expanding this capability with little identifiable sacri-
fice in quality. There exists a significant segment of the
population -- poor, near-poor, fixed and middle- income
groups -- who are increasingly in need of health service
benefits. With these premises, a statement of the central
issue might be, " how can the existing and potential capabil -
ity be applied to the existing need? "
Two barriers impeding the public's access to more ade-
quate health care and medical services have been identified;
the financial barrier and the proximity or geographical
barrier. These barriers are very real, near-national in
scope and cast in the inertia of existing parochial and
expedient attitudes; but they should not be considered im-
pregnable. The advent of change will likely evolve from
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public reaction. The growing medically needy are a growing
political constituency, no longer appeased by the simplistic
rhetoric of "more physicians of the highest quality,"
"improved institutional efficiency and teamwork," and trite
Madison Avenue catch phrases heralding more expensive and
increasingly deficient health insurance schemes. Change has
become inevitable; the manner in which change occurs is the
vitally important question.
America's future health care system will directly reflect
the nature of the struggle for change. Some form of govern-
ment sponsored national health insurance will come into
being. But it seems self-evident that if such a scheme is
cash indemnity oriented, or relies on the private insurance
industry, it will lead progressively to increasing costs
and chaos, accompanied by minimal benefits, and in turn to
increasing federal control of health insurance and services,
and thus to increasing centralization. Over-reaction to a
repeat of the Medicare and Medicaid experience, magnified
several times by application to the entire population,
might lead swiftly to a thoroughly socialized system in the
sense of a nationalized health service. In contrast, a pro-
posal which appears more 'radical' now, but provides health
service benefits within budgetary constraints, may achieve
much less centralized regulation and lead to a more 'moderate'
solution.
The nature of change and the resulting system will
reflect the attitudes of the medical professions and related
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economic and political entities. Unfortunately, past experi
ences, attitudes and behavior patterns bodes ill for a moder
ate solution. On some future date fiscal controls will be
implemented and the affected fee and price levels will be
initially set, most likely, at the average for a particular
time span. In anticipation of this event, it is in the
interest of the health care professionals, institutions, and
related industries to delay its occurrence and concurrently
escalate fee and price levels to the maximum extent possible
Hence, three of the proposals presently before congress are
basically cash indemnity approaches utilizing private health
insurance as intermediaries or carriers. Plans designed
such as these, if subsequently enacted, would likely be
viewed in retrospect as ineffective and costly delays on the
road to comprehensive national health service benefits (or
to socialized medicine) . Other more subtle forms of delay
may call for the situation to be 'studied' to find an
'optimal' or 'best' solution. In August 1973, the Rand
Corporation began such a study, "to help formulate a health
care financing plan for the nation." The president of Rand
stated that the study could cost $30 million over an eight
year period . [99]
A lesser struggle and more moderate solution may be
envisioned but, admittedly, only with a significant degree
of idealism with regard to the political structures of
health care providers and related interests. Certain key
elements would evolve other major developments impacting on
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the financial and proximity barriers to more adequate health
care. Some of the key elements are:
- Expansion of the number of physicians and other
health care personnel, and redesign of new and
existing source institutions (as in the Carnegie
Commission recommendations)
.
- Elimination of prohibitions and restrictions on
group practice.
- Enactment of a comprehensive, government sponsored,
universal health insurance program, designed as a
health service benefits plan.
The insurance statute would make each individual a
member of a prepaid group health benefits plan and effectively
equalize the paying ability of the public in all geographical
areas. Pockets of inherently well-to-do and high income per-
sons could continue to go 'first class' with supplementary
private insurance, but would attract a lesser proportion of
expanded health care resources. The plan would affect cost
controls and budgetary constraints in the sense of standard-
ized fee and price schedules and institution and group
practice contracted budgets. Some of the major developments
to be expected are:
- A national redistribution of health care personnel
and institutional resources.
- Development of innovative and efficient medical prac-
tice and institutional organizational forms: incentives
for augmenting the number of general family physicians;
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multispecialist groups with their own or affiliated
facilities; expansion of hospitals into comprehensive
health maintenance and service systems; community
hospital centers with affiliated neighborhood health
centers; comprehensive primary care complexes (if the
insurance plan required patients to register with a
primary physician or group)
.
Of most importance is the objective of improved medical
care at reasonable cost to more of the population. A pre-
paid health service benefits plan can direcly affect and
control two conditions permitting improved soundness of
medical care; one, the use of physicians' services is de-
termined by the patients' or subscribers' health needs; and
two, the kinds and amounts of services which physicians
render are determined by professional standards rather than
by the patient's ability to purchase services. The first
condition implies that the patients and physicians become
health maintenance oriented, and the second condition
implies the rendering of care and services on the basis of
medical rather than cost considerations.
The form of administration and control of this concep-
tual system will likely reflect the attitudes of organized
medicine and related interest groups. Bitter and costly
prior experiences may dictate a highly centralized bureau-
cratic system at the federal level. A decentralized system
-- a federal level policy board, regional regulatory and
advisory boards, and localized area control boards --
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reflecting a synthesis of professional and consumer needs
from federal to local level would be more in the public's
interest. However, design of such a system would require
strong medical profession participation and support with
commensurate consumer involvement.
As the respective positions of the public and private
sectors become more distinct, the prospects for a more
moderate solution are deteriorating. The Carnegie Commission,
in writing its special report, envisioned extensions of
federal financing not only for medical education, but also
for broad health care services and delivery systems, and a
national health insurance program. On the other hand, the
carefully worded AMA-AMMC joint statements, although explic-
itly soliciting federal funding, also solicit mobilization
of support from local -- city, county and state -- levels,
and private -- individuals, industries and foundations --
sources. Federal funding is advocated for "the education
component of medical center activity," construction, operation
and educational innovation in medical centers, medical
student subsidies, operational cost of medical schools, and
for research. Collectively, with AMA advocacy of funding
medical care through expansion of the existing inflationary
and ineffective approaches, this simplifies to a process of
dropping more and more billions into the present system for
financing the sources and purchasing resources.
Evidence of a possible turnabout on the physician issue
and further indications of the professional hard-line on
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health care benefits emerged at the 1973 AMA annual convention
In his opening address, the president of the AMA labeled the
nationwide shortage of physicians "a dangerous hoax" that
misstates the problem, misleads the public
,
and creates false
hopes. "Numbers are not the problem and never have been....
with 133 direct-care physicians per 100,000 persons, America
is well on its way to meeting the actual need for physicians."
Despite popular belief, America faces only improper distri-
bution of physicians -- too many in certain urban areas, too
few in rural communities and urban ghettos, the AMA president
explained. [100] Also in his opening remarks, he attacked
the Kennedy-Griffiths health insurance bill as an "insidious
threat" to the quality of medical care. [101]
At the same time the AMA released the results of a survey
showing that three doctors out of five who responded were dis-
satisfied with the amounts of money they were being paid
under the Medicare program; and a third of the doctors who
responded said they would either refuse to practice in a
nationalized health system, or would leave the practice of
medicine altogether if such a system were created. These
results are from an AMA survey of a segment of its own
membership. [102] Negative and scare propaganda has long
been a characteristic of the AMA, but could such attitudes
be generalized proportionately to the entire medical profes-
sion, as the AMA desires, then it would be all the more
reason to accelerate the expansion of the number of physi-
cians. Doctors holding such views would hopefully abandon
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the profession and be replaced by ones with concern for the
patients' health care. Seemingly in response, the California
Medical Association released the results of a small survey
indicating that future California doctors may shun large
hospitals in favor of practicing in isolated rural or urban
ghetto areas. Of 700 medical students and recent medical
graduates surveyed, half of the 500 who responded said they
would like to practice in rural areas, and a fourth said they
would like to work in ghettos; the students polled were less
inclined toward specialization than direct primary care; and
the younger students heavily favored "some form of national
health insurance." [103] Such news is refreshing but should
create only limited optimism; students' constructive inten-
tions and ideals must withstand a consistent barrage of
AMA-AMMC influence during formative and subservient years.
Clearly the political structure of the private sector
prefers expansion of existing systems for the enhancement of
personal incomes and corporate profits at the expense of
adequate health care for the public. The absurdity of this
situation is exemplified by the fact that elderly patients
pay more out-of-pocket costs for medical care now than before
Medicare was enacted. The government's own figures show that
the average personal payment for Americans aged 65 and over
has grown from $234 in fiscal 1966, the year before Medicare
began, to $276 for fiscal 1972. [104] The growing public
medical constituency hopefully, will not long ignore such
greed and callousness, nor such a situation as medical
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profession institutional ownership of large blocks of stock
in the drug industry. [105] The AMA, whose journal draws
heavy income from drug ads and whose pension fund has $10
million in drug stock, recently refused to publish an ad for
the book: Physician's Guide to Prescription Prices
,
which
gives doctors and consumers comparative costs of drugs. In
explanation, the AMA told the book's publishers, "we would
not presume to encourage efforts to 'fix' prices...." But
by refusing the ad, the AMA perpetuates precisely that
practice. [106]
Present federal medical and health related expenditures
are likely only a modest beginning. The American public may,
a decade or so hence, find itself funding production and
distribution of all of the nation's health care and related
resources. It would indeed be unfortunate if the same public
were then trying to purchase these publicly financed resources
in a falsely inflated and profit maximizing environment,
fostered and dominated by a discriminating medical monopoly,
and controlled by para-political professional associations
with their biased interests and seeming indifference to the
issue of adequate health care benefits for the population.
It appears infinitely more reasonable that the public will
insist on a national health service benefits system in
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